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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores the structure and significance of beliefs about the nature of 
gender/sex categories, or gender/sex diversity beliefs, across a series of empirical studies. In 
Chapter 1, I describe the recent history of the study of gender/sex categories and gender/sex 
diversity beliefs, and implications for the current sociopolitical situation of gender/sex 
minorities. Claims about the nature of gender/sex and the meaning of gender/sex categories are 
contentious both within and beyond feminist discourses, including in public policy and academic 
research, and this dissertation clarifies their implications for understanding gender/sex 
majorities’ attitudes about minorities.  
Next, in Chapter 2, I take a bottom-up approach to understanding heterogeneity in 
gender/sex diversity beliefs by examining variation in individuals’ definitions of gender/sex 
categories. I analyze the presence of sociocultural and/or biological content in participants’ 
definitions of the words woman, man, feminine, masculine, female, and male. Further, I examine 
the complexity of participants’ definitions and the role of social location factors, particularly 
gender/sex and sexual minority/majority status. In Chapter 3, I explore in-depth a sub-sample of 
transgender-exclusionary radical feminists who participated in the research described in Chapter 
2 to disrupt and control it. I contextualize why my research was targeted in particular and I 
describe implications for online diversity-related research more generally.  
In Chapter 4, I develop the Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale (GSDB), a survey 
measure of beliefs about the nature of gender/sex that are especially relevant to gender/sex 
minority identities. I create an item list with feedback from community experts (i.e., gender/sex
   xii 
minority individuals) and academic experts on gender/sex diversity and/or beliefs about the 
nature of social categories. Across multiple studies, I test the factor structure and test-retest 
reliability of the GSDB. Further, I examine the relationship of the GSDB to sociopolitical 
ideologies and attitudes about gender/sex minorities.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I develop an intervention to improve gender/sex majorities’ 
attitudes about gender/sex minorities and gender/sex diversity beliefs. The intervention compels 
gender/sex majority participants to visually map their own gender/sex identities on diagrams 
with sexual configurations theory (van Anders, 2015). I analyze the intervention’s immediate 
efficacy and whether effects endured at a follow-up four weeks later. 
Together, these studies clarify how varied people’s perspectives on gender/sex diversity 
currently are, patterns in gender/sex diversity beliefs that people hold, and the implications of 
gender/sex diversity beliefs for studying prejudice against gender/sex minorities. Ultimately, this 
dissertation provides a new conceptual framework and related survey measure for studying 
beliefs and attitudes about gender/sex categories. And, I identify promising new directions for 
interventions to challenge gender/sex majorities’ prejudice against minorities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Public recognition of the existence of gender and/or sex (gender/sex; van Anders, 2015)1 
diversity has increased rapidly in the early 21st century. For instance, gender/sex minority2 (i.e., 
transgender, non-binary, and gender/sex diverse) activism has become highly visible on college 
campuses in the U.S., including advocacy for gender-neutral bathrooms and social and 
institutional norms of asking for and using students’ self-designated pronouns (Scelfo, 2015). 
Numerous mainstream news media outlets have covered gender/sex minority topics in ways that 
assert that gender/sex is a diverse and non-binary social category (e.g., Escobar, 2016; Henig,
 
1 I use the term “gender/sex” to recognize the complex, sometimes inextricable relationship 
between sociocultural gender and evolved/physical sex (van Anders, 2015). Although gender/sex 
minority identities are often framed as only or primarily about gender in research and policy – 
and this is true for some individuals – many gender/sex minorities and majorities alike 
understand gender and sex as linked and do not always (or sometimes, ever) distinguish between 
the two (Pryzgoda & Chrisler, 2000; Schudson et al., 2017). Further, retaining “sex” in 
“gender/sex” makes clear how gender/sex diversity is often physical and embodied (e.g., intersex 
people or people who have medically transitioned gender/sexes). 
2 I use “minority” to refer to groups with marginalized positions within social hierarchies, and 
“majority” to refer to groups with dominant social positions (van Anders, 2015). Importantly, 
these terms refer to groups’ relations to power rather than simple statistical frequency. 
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 2017). This change in public awareness has been accompanied by increased visibility for 
gender/sex minorities. For example, television shows and films have included more transgender 
and non-binary characters, and exposure to trans-inclusive media narratives has been linked to 
more positive attitudes toward transgender individuals (Billard, 2019; Gillig et al., 2018). 
However, visibility has not yet afforded safety, respect, or fair treatment for gender/sex 
minorities in many aspects of everyday life, and prejudice and discrimination remain prevalent 
(James et al., 2016; van Anders et al., 2017).  
Beliefs about the nature of gender/sex relevant to perceptions of gender/sex minority and 
majority identities – or, gender/sex diversity beliefs, as I refer to them – often deal with the 
category structure of gender/sex, including whether or not categories like female and male are 
binary, have rigid boundaries, and change over time, among other aspects. Often in the past, 
researchers have treated people’s beliefs about the structure of gender/sex categories like female 
and male as monolithic and self-evident, but evidence suggests they may be more varied than 
previously thought (Bettcher, 2012, 2014; Bornstein & Bergman, 2010; Hoffman et al., 2005; 
Katz-Wise & Hyde, 2015; Richards et al., 2016; van Anders, 2015; van Anders et al., 2014). For 
instance, many young people believe that gender/sex is a spectrum, rather than a binary (Rivas, 
2015), and self-designate intermediate locations on survey measures that represent gender/sex 
this way (Baum et al., 2015).  
The belief that gender/sex is a spectrum (or a series of spectra, a landscape, or other 
nonbinary visual form; Trans Student Educational Resources, 2016; van Anders, 2015) contrasts 
with how Garfinkel (1967) and others have described the dominant lay conceptualization of 
gender/sex: “the natural attitude,” which includes beliefs about gender/sex categories as binary, 
mutually exclusive, static, and defined by genitals. Although much feminist, queer, and trans 
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scholarship and activism has worked to debunk the natural attitude about gender/sex (e.g., 
Bettcher, 2012; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Rosario, 2009), scholars still maintain that “These are the 
‘facts’ of gender in terms of Western reality” (Kessler & McKenna, 2000, p. 12). But while the 
natural attitude about gender/sex is pervasive, it is neither universally endorsed nor all-
encompassing of how individuals conceptualize gender/sex (Bettcher, 2012; Katz-Wise & Hyde, 
2015; Richards et al., 2016; van Anders, 2015). In this dissertation, I ask: how do individuals 
vary in their conceptualizations of gender/sex and its categories? What gender/sex diversity 
beliefs do people hold, and what is the significance of these beliefs for understanding and 
improving gender/sex majorities’ attitudes about minorities? 
Gender/Sex Categories in Research 
Gender/sex diversity beliefs center on the nature of gender/sex categories, which has 
been a focal topic for feminist and non-feminist research alike through much of the 20th and early 
21st centuries. One particular distinction in gender/sex categories has received significant 
attention from researchers: whether they are actually about “gender” (i.e., social roles) or “sex” 
(i.e., biological or bodily features; van Anders, 2015). Margaret Mead (1935) is widely credited 
as the first to theorize a distinction between sociocultural roles of women and men and biological 
femaleness or maleness (Delphy, 1993), and the subsequent popularization of the term “gender” 
to refer to these social roles is frequently attributed to sexologist John Money (1955). In the 
1970s, some feminist scholars advocated for a distinction between sex and gender to emphasize 
that the subordination of women is due to patriarchal social structures rather than essential 
characteristics of the female sex (Oakley, 1972; Rubin, 1975; Unger, 1979). Feminist social 
scientists developed categories like androgyny and sex or gender role orientation to study the 
multiple and fluid ways that people express gendered personalities and psychological 
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characteristics (Bem, 1974; Constantinople, 1973; Spence et al., 1975). Although these efforts to 
separate gender and sex relied on a conceptualization in which the former is sociocultural and the 
latter biological, gender too (or features that most would include within gender) has been 
biologized by many, perhaps most notably by evolutionary psychologists (Fausto-Sterling, 
1992). 
Contemporarily, many feminists continue to approach gender and sex as usefully 
separable, the former indexing sociocultural roles and traits and the latter biological bodies. 
Often, female/male are treated as sex categories, while woman/man and feminine/masculine are 
understood as gender categories (although ambiguously so). However, different scholars parse 
these terms different ways (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 2011). Many have also argued that gender 
and sex are, to some degree, mutually constitutive categories that must be considered in tandem 
(e.g., Fausto‐Sterling, 2005; Hyde et al., 2018; van Anders, 2013; van Anders et al., 2015, 2015; 
Wood & Eagly, 2012). Some scholars use “gender/sex” to refer to phenomena that cannot be 
easily separated into sociocultural or biological/bodily components, like whole identities 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2019; van Anders, 2015; van Anders & Dunn, 2009). Accordingly, I use 
“gender/sex” to holistically refer to gendered and sexed phenomena, including gender/sex’s 
categories (woman/man, female/male, feminine/masculine) following other feminist researchers 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2019; Galupo, Pulice-Farrow, et al., 2017; Hyde et al., 2018; van Anders, 2015; 
van Anders & Dunn, 2009).  
Scientists who study gender/sex outside feminist contexts often stick to assessing sex 
alone by asking whether research participants are female or male (Richards et al., 2016). 
Typically, they use female/male to refer to gender and sex alike, and feminine/masculine to refer 
to sex-linked behaviors or personality traits (or frequently, just as the adjective form of 
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female/male). However, collapsing sex and gender is not a universal practice in science. Many 
researchers who study transgender identities have increasingly found utility in distinguishing 
between gender identity (i.e., current identity as a woman, man, or gender diverse person, 
potentially regardless of bodily features) and sex assigned at birth, and asking about both (Bauer, 
2012; Herman, 2014; Tate et al., 2013).  
Clearly, there is significant variation both within and across disciplines in the meanings 
attributed to gender/sex categories. And this variation is consequential: many have critiqued 
research on topics including gender differences and sexuality, among others, that takes for 
granted the meaning or centrality of particular gender/sex categories (e.g., Jordan-Young, 2010; 
van Anders, 2015). Further, what these categories mean to individuals themselves, and how they 
parse which phenomena belong in each, remains unclear. Therefore, understanding gender/sex 
diversity beliefs necessitates a thorough investigation of how people conceptualize gender/sex 
categories themselves. 
Sociopolitical Stakes of Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs 
As feminist, queer, and trans social movements have re-shaped the sociopolitical 
landscapes of a range of societies, including the U.S., questions arise about how gender/sex 
diversity beliefs may have changed over time, and what the significance of these changes might 
be. However, social scientists have paid limited attention to such questions thus far. Feminist and 
queer scholars, both within and beyond the social sciences, have also tended to avoid questions 
of variation in individual beliefs about gender/sex, instead focusing on characterizing larger 
societal structures. For instance, many feminist and queer projects have focused on how people 
(re)produce gender in interactional and iterative but socioculturally constrained ways (e.g., 
Butler, 1993; West & Zimmerman, 1987). And inquiry tends to be centered on social structures 
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that enable or constrain such interactions rather than individuals’ own beliefs about what 
gender/sex is or how it is produced. It is important to note that much of this body of work 
predates (and perhaps, in part, helped produce) the current, widespread heterogeneity in 
gender/sex diversity beliefs. Consequently, these projects have rarely delved into gender/sex 
diversity beliefs themselves. 
But, gender/sex diversity beliefs are important. Myriad social, political, and intellectual 
debates hinge upon disagreements about how to define gender/sex categories, or the boundaries 
between them, and the stakes of these can be high. For instance, feminists have disagreed with 
one another over the boundaries and significance of the categories “woman” and “female,” 
including whether these categories are primary above other social categories, like race and class, 
and cissexist beliefs (i.e., beliefs that value cisgender identities and experiences above 
transgender and gender/sex diverse identities and experiences) like whether transgender women 
“properly” occupy these categories at all (Bettcher, 2007; Serano, 2013; Spelman, 1988). 
Additionally, while sex categories (e.g., female, male, intersex) frequently are treated as rigidly 
defined and stable, as per the natural attitude about gender/sex, many scholars have critiqued 
ideas of sex categories as inherently more binary, self-evident, homogenous, or static than gender 
(Butler, 1993; Delphy, 1993; Fausto-Sterling, 1992).  
Political conservatives, among others, have strongly objected to critiques of gender/sex as 
rigid and binary, and have battled against progressive attempts to clarify the complexity of 
gender/sex in the U.S. as well as globally (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017; van 
Anders et al., 2017). These political battles often play out over category definitions: for instance, 
in 2016, conservative legislators in North Carolina changed the language in their state’s 
nondiscrimination laws from “sex” to “biological sex” under the false and unscientific 
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assumption that “biological sex” refers to a separate, self-evident, natural category that excludes 
transgender people (General Assembly of North Carolina, 2016). And in 2018, a leaked Trump 
administration memo proposed defining gender as based on sex assigned at birth, thereby making 
gender/sex minority identities largely invisible under the law, which prompted the 
#WontBeErased social media campaign, among other activist efforts (Mervosh & Hauser, 2018). 
Active metaphysical debates about the nature of gender/sex exist outside of conventional 
political and academic arenas. For instance, “there are only two genders” is an oft-repeated 
phrase among the so-called “alt-right” who incorrectly view non-binary gender/sex as a recent, 
anti-realist, and unnatural trend particular to people active in online feminist communities 
(Pulice-Farrow et al., 2019; Squirrell, 2017). Popular YouTube content creators, both feminist 
and anti-feminist, have created videos about whether gender is binary or non-binary, some of 
which have received over one million views to date (e.g., ContraPoints, 2019; White, 2016). 
Numerous popular press articles have addressed the increased prevalence of non-binary 
gender/sex self-definition among young people, as well as young people’s awareness of a shift in 
gender/sex diversity beliefs and the place of gender/sex in society (e.g., Marsh, 2016).  
The nature of gender/sex and its categories is not only an active point of debate between 
feminists and anti-feminists, but also among feminists, both lay and academic. Self-identified 
“gender critical” feminists – more commonly known as “trans-exclusionary radical feminists” 
(TERFs) by their feminist critics – view the increased focus on transgender and non-binary 
gender/sex in feminist spaces as a threat to feminist goals and lesbian and gay rights (Ahmed, 
2016; Williams, 2016). Although no empirical data on the prevalence of TERF ideology among 
feminists exist, debates about TERF ideology are active in feminist activist and academic spaces, 
as well as popular media (Ahmed, 2016; Kim, 2020; Watson, 2016; Williams, 2016). These 
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debates typically fall outside of the scope of civil disagreement; adherents to TERF ideology 
frequently harass transgender women, in particular, via social media (McKinnon, 2018). 
In sum, metaphysical debates about the nature of gender/sex are presently active in 
political, academic, and lay contexts, among and between feminists and non-feminists alike. 
While much previous work has presumed that lay individuals almost universally endorse the 
natural attitude about gender/sex, contemporary evidence suggests individuals’ gender/sex 
diversity beliefs are increasingly heterogeneous. My research focuses on mapping the scope of 
gender/sex diversity beliefs and considering their significance for efforts to mitigate prejudice 
against gender/sex minorities.
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CHAPTER 2 
Individual Variation in Gender/Sex Category Definitions 
 In this chapter, I describe my survey research on variation in people’s definitions of the 
gender/sex categories woman, man, feminine, masculine, female, and male. Contemporary 
understandings of gender/sex categories are less static and less binary than they have been in the 
past. But, questions remain about exactly how diverse these understandings are, how that 
diversity might be reflected in how people define and use gender/sex-related language, and 
whether understandings of gender/sex are linked to social location, particularly gender/sex or 
sexual minority/majority status. This research contributes to current understandings of 
heterogeneity in people’s gender/sex diversity beliefs by examining variation in understandings 
of gender/sex categories.  
Gender/Sex Category Definitions 
 Little prior research has examined how individuals understand the composition of 
gender/sex categories, and to what extent those understandings might be heterogeneous. While 
there is evidence of considerable cross-cultural variation in the meanings attached to gender/sex 
categories, particularly femininity/masculinity and womanhood/manhood (Jandt & Hundley, 
2007; Tan, Shaw, Cheng, & Kim, 2013; Williams & Best, 1990), only a few studies have 
explored variation within a single cultural context by examining personal definitions of these 
concepts (Hoffman et al., 2005; Hunter & Davis, 1994; Kallen et al., 1980; Myers & Gonda, 
1982). However, these studies all have suggested considerable heterogeneity in personal 
definitions of gender/sex categories, particularly femininity/masculinity. For example, Hoffman
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 et al. (2005) found that women and men respectively defined femininity and masculinity with a 
wide variety of elements, including biological sex, gender self-confidence, gender self-
acceptance, and societal standards, among others.  
Heterogeneity in individuals’ definitions of female/male has received less attention 
relative to feminine/masculine, although there is reason to suspect they might be heterogeneous 
as well. For instance, there is considerable variation in the degree to which people understand 
both female/male and feminine/masculine in essentialist terms (fixed, binary) or social 
constructionist terms (fluid, continuous), although just-published research shows that 
feminine/masculine is viewed in more social constructionist and less essentialist terms than 
female/male (Lloyd & Galupo, 2019). Also, common uses of female/male often denote aspects of 
gender like appearance or identity, rather than just genital configuration or membership in a 
“natural” or “biological” category (Pryzgoda & Chrisler, 2000; Watzlawik, 2009). Even for 
individuals who understand female/male as denoting biological sex categories, there may be 
variation in the extent to which they perceive female/male as a fixed, stable attribute or as 
something that can be changed through particular surgico-medical and/or social means (van 
Anders et al., 2014). Additionally, media attention toward transgender issues has increased 
markedly in recent years and, accordingly, so has attention toward the scientific inaccuracy of 
the natural attitude about gender/sex (e.g., Henig, 2017; Steinmetz, 2014). These publications 
often rely on a distinction between sex assigned at birth (female/male) and current gender 
identity (girl/woman or boy/man), in contrast to the natural attitude about gender/sex, which 
collapses the meanings of these categories. Therefore, individuals might vary in how they 
distinguish sex categories (female/male) and gender identity categories (woman/man) based on 
their beliefs about what gender and sex are. 
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 Some recent scholarship has examined individuals’ personal definitions of terms 
specifically related to gender/sex diversity. Buck (2016) found that cisgender, heterosexual 
individuals defined the word “transgender” with reference to gender expression, gender identity, 
and/or change in gender/sex. Individuals who mentioned gender/sex change had higher trans-
prejudice than those who did not. Individuals who mentioned gender identity alone (or both 
gender identity and expression) had lower trans-prejudice than those who only mentioned gender 
expression or neither identity nor expression. This research demonstrates that individuals’ 
definitions of at least some gender/sex terms are importantly linked to social attitudes. To my 
knowledge, research has not yet examined other terms relevant to gender/sex diversity, such as 
“cisgender,” although evidence suggests that these terms are also politically contested, at least in 
particular subcultural contexts (e.g., Cava, 2016; Goldberg, 2014). 
Group Differences in Defining Gender/Sex Categories 
How might we expect groups, rather than just individuals, to differ from one another in 
how they define gender/sex categories? At a broad level, individuals who occupy privileged 
social locations linked to gender/sex might differ from marginalized individuals. Majority 
individuals might view social categories in ways that preserve the power hierarchies that benefit 
them (e.g., essentialist beliefs), whereas minorities might seek to challenge those hierarchies 
(Mahalingam, 2003, 2007). This perspective can be linked to feminist standpoint theory, which 
suggests that individuals who occupy marginalized positions in power hierarchies and critically 
engage with them have advantages over members of majorities in understanding the nature of 
those hierarchies (Harding, 2004). Therefore, it is possible that minority individuals will have 
more complex definitions of gender/sex categories than majority individuals due to greater 
critical engagement with gender/sex-based social hierarchy. For example, minorities might 
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describe several different ways a person could be a woman or a man to be inclusive of the 
breadth of people’s experiences. Alternatively, it is possible that majorities might describe more 
explicit, stringent criteria for being a woman or a man (e.g., defining a man as someone with a 
penis, testes, and XY chromosomes), whereas minorities might prefer simple definitions that are 
broad and inclusive (e.g., defining a man as any person who identifies as a man). 
Social groups that have challenged the natural attitude about gender/sex in political, legal, 
and sociocultural arenas — in particular, transgender individuals and other gender/sex minorities 
— might be especially likely to define gender/sex categories in ways that resist biological 
essentialism. For example, the idea that gender/sex is multifaceted and fundamentally nonbinary 
or spectrum-like is common in models of understanding and affirming gender/sex diversity 
adopted by community organizations (e.g., Trans Student Educational Resources, 2016; 
“Understanding gender,” n.d.). Also, the lived experiences of many gender/sex minority 
individuals – although not necessarily all – contradict key aspects of the natural attitude about 
gender/sex, including that gender/sex is immutable and based on genital configuration at birth 
(Bettcher, 2007; Kessler & McKenna, 2000). Therefore, many transgender people might avoid 
defining gender/sex categories in ways that align with the natural attitude about gender/sex 
simply because they know from their own experiences that it is inaccurate.  
Some evidence suggests that some groups of cisgender individuals might also 
conceptualize gender/sex in ways that recognize fluidity, nuance, and sociocultural influences. 
For instance, cisgender sexual minority individuals are more likely than cisgender heterosexual 
individuals to endorse a social constructionist view of gender (i.e., the belief that gender is a 
fluid, complexly determined social category rather than a natural given; Brownlie, 2006). 
Cisgender plurisexual (e.g., bisexual, pansexual) individuals also sometimes define their sexual 
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orientations in ways that accommodate gender/sex diversity in potential partners and recognize 
the existence of gender/sex diversity more broadly (Flanders et al., 2017; Galupo, Ramirez, et al., 
2017).  
People might also differ in how they conceptualize gender/sex categories based on 
race/ethnicity or their own gender. Men are more likely than women to hold essentialist beliefs 
about gender/sex and to endorse genetic determinist explanations of gendered behavior and 
gender/sex itself (Cole et al., 2007; Haslam & Whelan, 2008; Keller, 2005; Lloyd & Galupo, 
2019; Smiler & Gelman, 2008). White people are more likely than Black people to endorse 
genetic causes for gendered attributes such as nurturance (Cole et al., 2007; Jayaratne et al., 
2009). These findings are consistent with theory about privileged social groups’ tendency to 
endorse essentialist views (Mahalingam, 2007). Therefore, it is plausible that privileged groups’ 
tendency toward biological essentialist beliefs about gender/sex relates to group differences in 
conceptualizations of how biologically or socioculturally defined various gender/sex categories 
are.    
The Current Study 
I conducted a study to elucidate how individuals define gender/sex categories. Further, I 
intended to determine whether social location via gender/sex and sexual identities affects the 
complexity and content of individuals’ definitions. Ultimately, my goal was to trace 
contemporary understandings of gender/sex categories and heterogeneity in individuals’ use of 
gender/sex-related language. I aimed to address 3 hypotheses (H’s): 
H1: (a) Female and male will be defined primarily through biological content. 
(b) Feminine and masculine will be defined primarily through sociocultural content.  
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(c) Woman and man will be defined through a mix of biological and sociocultural 
content. 
H2: Gender/sex and sexual minority individuals will define gender/sex categories using 
more sociocultural content and less biological content than majority individuals. 
H3: Gender/sex and sexual majority individuals will have simpler definitions of 
gender/sex categories than minority individuals (i.e., majorities will delineate fewer 
aspects of gender/sex that define the categories). 
Methods  
Participants 
I recruited 516 people to complete an online survey on how people think about gender. 
my final sample consisted of all participants who completed at least one gender/sex category 
definition (N = 307); 98% of the final sample completed all six definitions (n = 302). Most 
participants who started the study but did not complete any gender/sex category definitions 
dropped out of the study shortly after consenting to participate. Participants were required to be 
18 years of age or older and to have the ability to read and write in English. In addition to 
recruiting for participants of any gender and sexual identity online via craigslist.org, I conducted 
targeted online recruitment of gender and sexual minority individuals on craigslist.org and 
reddit.com. Following completion of the survey, participants were able to opt into a raffle to win 
Amazon.com gift certificates. 
 Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 years (M = 35.85, SD = 14.17). They self-
identified their racial/ethnic identities, and I coded them as follows: African American/Black (n 
= 14; 4.6%), Asian or Asian American (n = 14; 4.6%), Native American or Indigenous (n = 2; 
0.7%), Latinx (n = 8; 2.6%), Middle Eastern (n = 3; 1.0%), Multiracial (n  = 19; 6.2%), White (n 
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= 224; 73.0%), or as non-responders (n = 23; 7.5%). Participants self-identified their sexual 
orientation identities, and I categorized their responses as: asexual (n = 6), bisexual (n = 51), 
gay/lesbian (n = 73), heterosexual (n = 110), pansexual (n = 15), queer (n = 6), 
unsure/questioning (n = 4), using multiple labels (n = 17), using another label not already listed 
here (n = 8), and non-responders (n = 17). The majority of my sample (n = 185; 60.2%) reported 
their highest level of education as graduating from a four-year college or university or higher; 
others reported some college (n = 74), graduating from a two-year college or technical school (n 
= 21), graduating from high school (n = 20) or less than graduating from high school (n = 7).  
Participants indicated their current gender/sex as woman (n = 212), man (n = 47), or not 
listed (n = 45), and three were non-responders. Of those who indicated their gender/sex was not 
listed, participants used labels specifying trans identity (e.g., transgender, FTM, trans woman; n 
= 8), intersex status (n = 1), a label indicating a non-binary gender/sex identity (e.g., non-binary, 
genderqueer, agender; n = 12), or responses that detailed nuances of their gender/sex (e.g., 
outness, beliefs about gender/sex) or other idiosyncratic response (n = 8), or opposition to the 
question itself based on the perception that my use of the term “gender/sex” conflated gender and 
sex (n = 16; for further discussion of this, see Facebook Subsample). I asked about participants’ 
status as transgender or cisgender in multiple ways, including asking about self-identification as 
transgender (n = 63) or not (n = 240), with four non-responders. I also asked whether participants 
identified as cisgender, and participants responded yes (n = 177) or no (n = 123), with seven non-
responders; notably, many participants responded no because they oppose the use of the word 
cisgender at all (see Facebook Subsample). I also asked whether participants had transitioned 
gender/sexes medically and/or socially, and they indicated yes (n = 24), no (n = 234), or that they 
are currently transitioning (n = 44), with five non-responders. 
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Facebook Subsample  
During data collection, I discovered a rapid influx of participants from Facebook (FB; N 
= 170; though only 120 completed at least one gender/sex category definition), despite no 
research team members having shared the survey link on Facebook. Many of these participants 
noted that they found my survey through Facebook groups for self-identified gender-critical 
feminists, also commonly referred to as trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERF; see 
Goldberg, 2014; Watson, 2016). TERF ideology involves the belief that transgender individuals 
are members of their sex assigned at birth rather than their present gender/sex. Frequently, 
individuals who subscribe to TERF ideology argue that transgender women are not really women 
and therefore not the proper subjects of feminism (Bettcher, 2017; Goldberg, 2014). I use 
“TERF” rather than “gender-critical” because the latter is vague and imprecise; many feminists 
who assert the validity of transgender identities are also critical of gender as a structure of social 
power. Further, the cisgender, radical feminist creators of the term “TERF” intended it as a 
descriptive term for a variant of radical feminism that calls for the exclusion of transgender 
women from feminism, as opposed to radical feminisms that include transgender women 
(Williams, 2016). 
Adherents to TERF ideology can be of any gender/sex or sexual identity, but are perhaps 
most commonly women and/or sexual minorities (Goldberg, 2014). In my FB subsample, 
participants were mostly women (n = 98) and some men (n = 6). They identified as lesbian/gay 
(n = 44), heterosexual (n = 39), bisexual (n = 18), used another label (n = 8), used multiple labels 
(n = 3), or provided a detailed explanation of their sexualities (n = 3). And while many TERF 
adherents are women and/or sexual minorities, the converse is not true; TERF ideology is 
uncommon among women and/or sexual minorities more generally (Goldberg, 2014). 
   17 
Some FB participants described an oppositional, motivated rationale for participating in 
my study, which they perceived as biased in favor of recognizing gender/sex diversity (e.g., “[A] 
friend shared it with me on facebook [sic] because she wanted me to present my anti-gender 
viewpoints despite the survey being biased to an ideological belief in gender”). Because I did not 
originally have research questions associated with TERF ideology, and including them in the 
general sample would ideologically skew my other groups, I decided to include this group 
separately for exploratory purposes. 
Groups for Analysis  
I categorized individuals into four groups for analyses pertinent to social identity (H2 and 
H3): gender/sex minority individuals of any sexual identity (GSMin; n = 82), cisgender sexual 
minorities (CisMin; n = 40), cisgender sexual majorities (CisMaj; n = 62), and my subsample of 
participants from Facebook discussion groups on TERF ideology (FB; n = 120). See Table 2.1 
for a breakdown of each group by gender/sex and sexual orientation identities. GSMin consisted 
of participants who indicated one or more of the following: (1) identification as transgender, (2) 
that they have transitioned gender/sexes or are currently transitioning, (3) a sex assigned at birth 
that differs from their present gender/sex, or (4) use of a gender/sex minority label other than or 
in addition to “transgender” (e.g., genderqueer, gender non-conforming). Of the remaining non-
FB participants, all who indicated their sexual identity was heterosexual (without qualifications; 
e.g., “mostly heterosexual”) were in the CisMaj group and all who indicated their sexual identity 
was not exclusively heterosexual were in the CisMin group. FB participants were kept separate 
from the other three groups for all analyses, regardless of their gender/sex or sexual identities.   
Coding Gender/Sex Category Definitions 
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In my survey, I asked participants to define six terms: woman, man, feminine, masculine, 
female, and male. Participants received the following instructions: “Please provide your own 
personal definition of the following words related to gender/sex. Do not use any resources to 
help you, like a dictionary. Do not worry about whether you are giving the ‘right’ answer. You 
might find that you define some of these words the same way, and that’s fine. We want to know 
how you understand what each word means, whatever that might be.” 
Content Coding  
I and another coder coded participants’ definitions for content relevant to my research 
questions. First, the coders read through all participants’ definitions and took notes on the range 
of content participants included. Coders then developed a preliminary coding scheme using 
inductively generated codes, in addition to codes generated based on theory such as: whether 
participants mention sex and/or gender, whether they indicated a sociocultural and/or biological 
origin for the category, which other categories they used in their definitions of a given category, 
whether they included qualifying language, and the complexity of their definition (see 
Complexity Coding). Most inductively generated codes covered specific biological or 
sociocultural features, although some dealt with other aspects of definitions (Tables 2 and 3).  
Following creation of my preliminary codebook, the coders separately coded 20% of 
definitions for each category, and met to revise the coding scheme throughout the process. 
Coders resolved discrepancies in coding for these first 20% of definitions until Cohen’s κ was 
above 0.70 for each code. For over 90% of codes, κ was also above 0.80, indicating a high level 
of agreement. Complexity was my only ordinal code, so I calculated agreement separately using 
Krippendorff’s α with the KALPHA macro for SPSS, which can accommodate ordinal variables 
(Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). For all six categories’ complexity codes, I found α > 0.70 and 
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indicated agreement ranging from satisfactory to excellent. Next, the coders separately coded all 
participants’ gender/sex category definitions. Finally, the coders met to resolve all coding 
discrepancies to consensus through discussion. 
Complexity Coding  
I and another coder coded for definitions’ complexity using a modified version of the 
integrative complexity coding scheme (Baker-Brown et al., 1992). Integrative complexity is a 
means of conceptualizing the complexity with which an individual processes information via 
their capacity to consider and synthesize multiple perspectives on a given topic. It is coded based 
on the degree of conceptual differentiation (how many perspectives on or aspects of a 
phenomenon do they consider?) and integration (do they integrate these aspects together to 
develop an analysis of the topic?) in a participant’s response. Scores of 1-3 represent 
progressively greater degrees of differentiation, and scores of 4-7 represent high levels of 
differentiation accompanied by progressively greater degrees of integration. Differentiation is 
sequenced before integration on the rating scale because differentiation is a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for integration (i.e., an individual must distinguish multiple perspectives on 
or aspects of a phenomenon in order to integrate them into an analysis; Suedfeld, Tetlock, & 
Streufert, 1992).  
Integrative complexity has been frequently used to understand the complexity of 
individuals’ cognitive processes as a trait-level characteristic or the complexity with which they 
think about a particular social or political issue. Baker-Brown et al. (1992) stated that definitions 
of words, and other forms of writing in which there is a simple, correct answer, cannot be scored 
for integrative complexity. However, the definitions of some words such as gender/sex 
categories are politically contested, and so how complexly participants define the terms provides 
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one means of understanding how complex they think gender/sex itself is. Further, while 
individuals’ personal definitions of terms should not typically be expected to evince integration, 
they may still vary substantially in the degree to which individuals list different factors that 
comprise a definition or different perspectives on the term. Therefore, in my study, I chose to 
focus primarily on the degree of differentiation in a participant’s response, and considered only 
the presence or absence of integration (1 = low differentiation; 2 = moderate differentiation; 3 = 
high differentiation; 4 = high differentiation accompanied by any amount of integration; see 
Table 2.4 for examples). I did so because my prompt did not explicitly call for integration; I 
instructed participants to define gender/sex categories, not analyze them (although notably, a 
small number of participants did develop analyses of gender/sex categories in their definitions, 
which were coded as 4’s). I also did not treat participants’ definition complexity ratings as 
evidence of their trait-level cognitive complexity because there is no evidence of a link between 
gender/sex category definition complexity and other aspects of cognition. Instead, I understand 
my codes only to index participants’ sense of how multifaceted gender/sex category categories 
are. 
Definition complexity is logically linked to response length; short responses should 
typically differentiate fewer dimensions of a category’s definition than a long response. 
Therefore, I examined correlations between the word count of definitions and complexity ratings. 
Correlations were expectedly high (r’s between 0.75 and 0.80 for the six gender/sex categories), 
which supports the validity and logical coherence of my coding scheme. 
Results  
Biological and Sociocultural Content Analyses  
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I examined whether people’s definitions of gender/sex categories varied based on 
inclusion of biological and sociocultural content across categories (H1) and across gender/sex 
and sexual identity groups (H2). I created variables indicating whether each definition had any 
biological or sociocultural features coded. I chose to analyze presence/absence of biological or 
sociocultural content rather than frequency because definitions varied widely in length and 
number of features listed. I conducted all analyses twice, first excluding FB participants followed 
by analyses including FB, in order to separately examine the influence of this subsample on any 
effects I observed. 
Individual-Level Comparisons Across Gender/Sex Category Definitions (H1)  
I conducted chi-square tests to compare the presence or absence of biological and 
sociocultural content in definitions across the six gender/sex categories (i.e., woman, man, 
feminine, masculine, female, and male; Table 2.2). I found that the number of participants who 
included any biological content in their definition varied across the six categories, χ2(5) = 
178.17, p < 0.001. I therefore examined adjusted standardized residuals to identify whether the 
frequencies of including any biological content differed between individual categories (Sharpe, 
2015). Significantly more definitions of female (n = 106) and male (n = 112) included any 
biological content than definitions of woman (n = 50) and man (n = 44). Definitions of both 
female/male and woman/man more frequently included biological content than feminine (n = 22) 
and masculine (n = 34), p < 0.05, with the exception of masculine and man, p > 0.05. I also 
found that the number of participants who included any sociocultural content in their definition 
varied across the six categories, χ2(5) = 220.61, p < 0.001. Examining adjusted standardized 
residuals indicated that significantly more definitions of feminine (n = 166) and masculine (n = 
155) included any sociocultural content than definitions of woman (n = 99) and man (n = 104), 
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and definitions of both feminine/masculine and woman/man more frequently included 
sociocultural content than female (n = 66) and male (n = 59), p < 0.05. 
I repeated my analyses including FB participants and found essentially the same patterns 
across categories for both biological and sociocultural content (i.e., female/male > woman/man > 
feminine/masculine for biological content, and the opposite pattern for sociocultural content). 
The only difference that emerged after including FB was that frequency of inclusion of 
biological content became significantly greater for man (n = 86) than masculine (n = 46), p < 
0.05. 
Group-Level Comparisons Within Gender/Sex Category Definitions (H2)  
I conducted logistic regressions to predict the likelihood of biological and sociocultural 
content being present or absent in participants’ gender/sex category definitions based on their 
own gender/sex and sexual identities. I coded GSMin as the reference group in each analysis. I 
controlled for age because it varied across my four groups, F(3, 299) = 33.71, p < 0.001; GSMin: 
M = 26.59, SD = 7.90, CisMaj: M = 33.87, SD = 13.89, CisMin: M = 33.25, SD = 11.78, FB: M = 
43.88, SD = 13.89. I calculated separate logistic regression models for each of the six gender/sex 
categories for both biological and sociocultural content (i.e., 12 total logistic regression models). 
To account for potential Type I error inflation due to multiple comparisons, I applied the 
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure with a false discovery rate of 0.05 (Benjamini & Hochberg, 
1995). My analyses were sufficiently statistically powered, particularly due to the high event 
rates of my dependent variables (Hsieh, 1989). 
I analyzed whether group membership predicted the odds of including any biological 
content in gender/sex category definitions (Table 2.5). Group membership was a significant 
predictor of inclusion of biological content in definitions of woman, p = 0.004. CisMaj 
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participants had greater odds of including biological content in their definitions than GSMin 
participants.  
Group membership predicted the likelihood of including any sociocultural content in 
definitions of woman, man, female, and male, p < 0.001 (Table 2.6). FB and CisMaj had 
significantly lower odds of including sociocultural content in their definitions of all four 
categories than GSMin. GSMin had greater odds of including sociocultural content in their 
definitions than CisMin for woman and man but not female or male. Group membership did not 
significantly predict inclusion of sociocultural content for both feminine and masculine, p > 0.05.  
I repeated all analyses including the FB group and found that all non-significant models 
remained non-significant except two: female, p < 0.001, and male, p < 0.001. The model for 
woman remained significant, p = 0.01.  In addition, I repeated analyses with CisMin coded as the 
reference group to specifically compare CisMin with CisMaj. CisMin and CisMaj did not 
significantly differ in their odds of including biological and/or sociocultural content in their 
definitions of any gender/sex category, p > 0.05. 
Finally, I analyzed whether other social identities (i.e., race/ethnicity and comparisons 
between women and men) affected how much biological or sociocultural content individuals 
included in their gender/sex category definitions. I did not control for age in these analyses 
because there were no age differences between women and men or across race/ethnicity groups, 
p > 0.05. There were no differences in how frequently white people and people of color included 
sociocultural or biological content for any gender/sex category definitions, p > 0.05. There were 
also no significant differences in how frequently women and men included sociocultural or 
biological content for any gender/sex category definitions, p > 0.05.   
Definition Complexity Analyses (H3) 
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 I analyzed the complexity of each definition using a modified integrative complexity 
coding scheme (see Methods). I predicted that minority individuals (GSMin, CisMin) would 
have more complex definitions of gender/sex categories than majority individuals (CisMaj). Due 
to the high frequency of simple definitions (i.e., complexity = 1) for each of the six categories, 
distributions of complexity codes were highly right-skewed. Therefore, the analyses in this 
section all use non-parametric statistical tests.  
First, I examined Spearman rank correlations between complexity codes to examine 
whether including a complex definition for one term was associated with complexity for others. 
Correlations between complexity codes within a pair of gender/sex categories (e.g., woman and 
man) were all very large (woman/man: ρ = 0.79; feminine/masculine: ρ = 0.76; female/male: ρ = 
0.79), which supports my qualitative observation that participants frequently defined paired 
gender/sex categories in identical ways, only swapping out language accordingly (e.g., woman: 
“a person with XX chromosomes” and man: “a person with XY chromosomes”). Complexity 
codes were also significantly positively correlated across all non-paired categories, although at 
lower magnitudes (0.14 < ρ’s < 0.31). 
I conducted Kruskal-Wallis tests on complexity codes for each of the six gender/sex 
categories across the four identity groups (Figure 2.1). I could not control for age in these 
analyses, but I independently confirmed via regression that age was not a significant predictor of 
definition complexity for any gender/sex category, p > 0.05. Definition complexity varied based 
on group membership for definitions of woman, H(2) = 10.35, p = 0.006, man, H(2) = 12.01, p = 
0.002, feminine, H(2) = 6.32, p = 0.04, masculine, H(2) = 6.34, p = 0.04, female, H(2) = 25.17, p 
< 0.001, and male, H(2) = 21.06, p < 0.001. I examined pairwise comparisons for each of the 
significant results. I again applied the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to control for multiple 
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comparisons. For definitions of woman, CisMaj, p = 0.005, and CisMin, p = 0.008, both had 
significantly less complex definitions than GSMin and did not differ from one another. For man, 
GSMin also had significantly more complex definitions than the other groups (CisMaj: p = .006; 
CisMin: p = .002), which did not differ from one another. GSMin had significantly more 
complex definitions than CisMaj for feminine, p = 0.02, and masculine, p = 0.02. For female, 
CisMaj had less complex definitions than GSMin, p < 0.001, and CisMin, p = 0.01. GSMin also 
had more complex definitions than CisMin, p < 0.001. For male, CisMaj had less complex 
definitions than GSMin, p < 0.001. 
When I repeated my analyses with FB, all effects held constant except for feminine, 
which was no longer significant, H(3) = 7.13, p = 0.07. The pairwise comparison for definition 
complexity of masculine between GSMin and CisMaj also became non-significant, p = 0.03. FB 
had significantly less complex definitions of woman, p = 0.001, and man, p < 0.001 than GSMin. 
FB also had significantly more complex definitions of masculine, p = 0.02, female, p < 0.001, 
and male, p < 0.001, than CisMaj.  
Patterns in Miscellaneous Codes 
In addition to my biological and sociocultural codes, I analyzed a variety of codes related 
to other aspects of gender/sex category definitions (see Table 2.3 for full list and code 
frequencies). These analyses were exploratory; most involve inductively generated codes. Here, I 
describe a few patterns I observed.  
One notable pattern occurred in one of my codes about the various ways in which 
participants described gender/sex categories as problematic, including whether the categories 
were defined by stereotypes, were meaningless, or whether the participant defined the category 
in a manner that self-consciously contradicted a normative definition. While the latter two codes 
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were relatively infrequent across categories, many participants specifically noted, while defining 
feminine (n = 39; 12.9%) and masculine (n = 43; 14.1%), that feminine and masculine are 
stereotypical or implicate stereotypes to some degree.  
I coded whether participants included the terms gender and/or sex in their definitions to 
better understand how individuals associate the six categories with gender and/or sex. 
Frequencies of using both gender and sex in a single definition are listed in Table 2.3 but were 
excluded from statistical comparisons because expected counts for cells were often less than 5. I 
found that usage of gender and sex varied significantly across the categories, χ2(5) = 71.07, p < 
0.001. Comparison of individual cells via adjusted standardized residuals revealed that gender 
was mentioned significantly more often than expected and sex significantly less than expected 
for woman, man, feminine, and masculine, and sex was mentioned significantly more often than 
gender for female and male. This effect appeared to be largely driven by the high number of 
mentions of sex for female (n = 90) and male (n = 88). Therefore, differential usage of sex and 
gender appeared especially salient for female and male compared to other gender/sex categories. 
 I coded which other gender/sex categories were mentioned in a given gender/sex category 
definition as a means of understanding which gender/sex categories were being used as reference 
categories to define others. I found that for woman and man, female and male were mentioned 
respectively in over 60% of definitions (female in 63.4% of woman definitions; male in 63.2% of 
man definitions). For feminine, woman (24.8%) and female (35.8%) were both mentioned 
somewhat frequently, as well as man (26.6%) and male (36.4%) for masculine. However, for 
female and male, other categories were mentioned relatively less frequently: woman appeared in 
only 15.5% of female definitions and man in only 11.1% of male definitions. This might suggest 
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that many individuals use female and male as foundational categories to define other gender/sex 
categories. 
 I also examined whether definitions mentioned cisgender or transgender status to explore 
which gender/sex categories individuals associated with these terms. I conducted a chi-square 
test to compare across the six gender/sex categories and found that cisgender/transgender status 
was mentioned for some categories more than others χ2(5) = 32.91, p < 0.001. Specifically, a 
number of participants brought up cisgender/transgender status in definitions of woman (n = 33) 
and man (n = 31). They brought up cisgender/transgender status slightly less frequently in 
definitions of female (n = 25) and male (n = 25), and only occasionally in definitions of feminine 
(n = 7) and masculine (n = 6).  I observed a similar pattern in how often participants described a 
category as an identity or membership in a category as based in self-identification (see Table 2.2, 
“Identity”), suggesting that participants might have considered gender identity and 
cisgender/transgender status as relevant to the terms woman, man, female, and male, and, to a 
much lesser extent, to feminine or masculine.  
Discussion 
 My research investigated heterogeneity in individuals’ definitions of these gender/sex 
categories: woman/man, feminine/masculine, and female/male. I found that individuals’ 
definitions of gender/sex categories vary in meaningful ways, including whether they contain 
biological and/or sociocultural content and in their degree of complexity. Also, I found evidence 
for variation in gender/sex category definitions based on social location. Status as a gender/sex 
minority or majority, and sexual minority/majority status to a lesser extent, mattered for 
individuals’ gender/sex category definitions. Overall, my study demonstrates that there is 
heterogeneity in the extent to which individuals’ definitions of gender/sex categories align with 
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the natural attitude about gender (i.e., perceiving gender/sex as immutable and defined by 
genitals; Garfinkel, 1967; Kessler & McKenna, 2000). This aligns with recent popular and 
scholarly accounts of emergent, nonessentialist understandings of gender/sex becoming 
increasingly prevalent (Henig, 2017; Norton & Herek, 2013; Steinmetz, 2014). My research 
helps clarify the scope and implications of contemporary heterogeneity in understandings of 
gender/sex language. 
I found support for all three parts of H1: individuals included more biological content in 
their definitions of female/male than other categories (H1a), more sociocultural content in 
definitions of feminine/masculine (H1b), and included intermediate amounts of biological and 
sociocultural content in definitions of woman/man (H1c). These findings align with previous 
research that has suggested that individuals generally associate biological aspects with terms like 
sex, female, and male and sociocultural aspects with gender, feminine, and masculine (Pryzgoda 
& Chrisler, 2000). My study expands upon previous literature by presenting evidence that 
woman and man are defined with intermediate levels of biological and sociocultural content. I 
interpret this finding as indicating that people’s conceptualizations of the categories women and 
men are rooted in both gender and sex, which mirrors contemporary scientific definitions of 
these terms (e.g., “gender/sex”; Hyde et al., 2018; van Anders, 2015).  
Another novel finding from my research is that social location via status as a gender/sex 
or sexual minority or majority is linked to whether individuals include biological and/or 
sociocultural content in certain gender/sex category definitions. My results partially supported 
H2: cisgender sexual majorities defined woman using biological content more frequently than 
gender/sex minorities, and they defined woman and man using sociocultural content less 
frequently than gender/sex minorities. Gender/sex minorities did not significantly differ from 
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cisgender sexual minorities in their frequency of including biological or sociocultural content in 
definitions of any gender/sex category. 
Why might cisgender sexual majorities differ from gender/sex minorities in how they 
define woman/man? One possibility is that gender/sex minorities define woman and man in ways 
that are intentionally inclusive due to a greater understanding of the diversity of women’s and 
men’s gender/sexed bodily features (e.g., not all men might have penises, but all men might self-
identify as men). Therefore, gender/sex minorities might emphasize sociocultural aspects like 
identity in their gender/sex category definitions. Another possibility is that gender/sex minorities 
and cisgender sexual majorities both perceive gender/sex in ways that socially benefit them. For 
majorities, this could involve perceiving gender/sex in ways that align with the natural attitude 
about gender, which naturalizes cisgender identity and erases gender/sex minority identities; for 
minorities, this could mean perceiving gender/sex in ways that reflect its complexity in their own 
lived experiences and the experiences of other members of their communities. This latter 
possibility is reflected in contemporary debates over gender/sex-segregated public restrooms 
(van Anders et al., 2017). For example, cisgender, sexual majority, conservative politicians in the 
U.S. and other officials have created policies to define gender as wholly biological and 
synonymous with sex assigned at birth (General Assembly of North Carolina, 2016). Proponents 
of these policies that seek to restrict transgender people’s access to public facilities have 
frequently justified them by explicitly arguing that they socially benefit cisgender people – often 
cisgender girls and women, specifically – and disregarding their negative impact on gender/sex 
minorities (van Anders et al., 2017). 
Not all of my results supported H2. Notably, cisgender sexual minorities did not differ 
from cisgender sexual majorities in how frequently they included biological or sociocultural 
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content in gender/sex category definitions. This finding suggests that gender/sex and sexual 
minority statuses do not have equivalent effects on understandings of gender/sex categories. 
Some prior research has demonstrated that sexual identity moderates cisgender people’s attitudes 
about transgender people (Werriner et al., 2013). But how sexual identity might impact cisgender 
individuals’ understandings of gender/sex itself (e.g., under which conditions those 
understandings of gender/sex are inclusive of gender/sex diversity) remains a topic for further 
investigation.  
My results largely supported H3. Gender/sex minority participants’ definitions of woman 
and man were more complex than the other groups’ definitions. Gender/sex minority participants 
also had more complex definitions of feminine, masculine, female, and male than cisgender 
sexual majorities. Cisgender sexual majorities had the least complex definitions of female of any 
group. These findings indicate that gender/sex minority or majority status matters for the depth 
of people’s thinking about gender/sex categories. And, they align with what feminist standpoint 
theory might predict; namely, that minority groups who critically engage with their minority 
identities have insights into social categories through which they are minoritized that may not be 
readily accessible to majorities (Harding, 2004). Cisgender individuals, particularly cisgender 
sexual majorities, might think about gender/sex less than gender/sex minority individuals 
because of their privileged social location in a gender/sex-based hierarchy. Majorities’ relative 
inattention to gender/sex might then manifest in definitions of gender/sex categories that involve 
less differentiation between factors influencing gender/sex category membership and less 
engagement with nuance. At the same time, recent findings indicate that some cisgender 
individuals might think about their gender/sexes in more multidimensional ways than previously 
thought – especially, but not exclusively, cisgender sexual minorities (Abed et al., 2019; 
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Jacobson & Joel, 2018; Joel et al., 2014). Future research might directly examine links between 
how frequently or deeply individuals think about gender/sex, their status as gender/sex minorities 
or majorities, and their understandings of gender/sex and its categories.  
While I found that gender/sex and sexual minority/majority status mattered for content 
type and definition complexity, I found null effects for comparisons between women and men 
and comparisons between people of color and white people. Why might this be the case? While 
previous evidence indicates that women and/or Black people have less biologically essentialist 
beliefs about the differences between women and men than do men and/or white people, it is 
possible that these differences are more evident in beliefs and attitudes (e.g., essentialism) than 
gender/sex category definitions (Cole et al., 2007; Smiler & Gelman, 2008). I focused on 
definitions because of my interest in variation in understandings of gender/sex language and 
conceptions of gender/sex categories. It is possible that comparisons between women and men or 
race/ethnicity comparisons are more meaningful when attitudes are measured alongside or 
instead of variation in definitions. 
Exploratory Findings 
Because I did not anticipate having a group composed primarily of TERF adherents in 
my study, the FB group was not included in H2 or H3. However, my exploratory analyses 
revealed several aspects of this group’s gender/sex category definitions worth discussing. One 
such finding was that the FB group defined female/male using biological content more frequently 
than gender/sex minority participants and they defined woman/man and female/male using 
sociocultural content less frequently. These findings align with extant work on TERF ideology, 
which typically posits that woman/man and female/male are purely biological categories 
(Watson, 2016). For example, in responses to open-ended questions, many FB participants 
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criticized my use of the term “gender/sex,” because it suggests woman/man and female/male 
have sociocultural elements. It is important to note that much recent scholarship indicates that 
these gender/sex categories do have sociocultural elements, both scientifically and pragmatically 
in everyday language use (Hyde et al., 2018; Pryzgoda & Chrisler, 2000; van Anders, 2015). The 
results of the present study also indicate that people of all gender/sex and sexual identities 
understand woman/man, and female/male to a lesser extent, to encompass sociocultural features 
– particularly identity (Table 2.2). Therefore, my results suggest that conceptions of woman/man 
and female/male that position them as self-evident, wholly biological categories (e.g., TERF 
ideology, anti-trans public policies) do not align with the varied content of people’s definitions 
of these categories (woman/man especially, which participants defined with a wide range of 
sociocultural features). 
My exploratory analyses of codes indexing features of definitions other than complexity 
or biological and sociocultural content had implications for how gender/sex categories link to a 
variety of other terms. Patterns in participants’ references to gender and sex in their definitions 
were particularly compelling. Participants used the term sex frequently in definitions of 
female/male, but not other categories, and female/male definitions frequently included biological 
content and not sociocultural content. One possible explanation for this finding is that the term 
sex is particularly strongly associated with female/male, whereas gender is not as strongly linked 
to any particular gender/sex category. An important potential implication is that a survey 
question worded as “What is your sex?” or options like “male or female” might cue participants 
to think about their bodies or biologies, as opposed to their identities as women, men, or 
gender/sex diverse individuals, more so than “What is your gender?” or possibly “What is your 
gender/sex?” This might rightly be distressing to some individuals, particularly some transgender 
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and nonbinary individuals who might feel that researchers are more interested in their bodily 
anatomy or sex assigned at birth than their present identities. At the same time, gender/sex 
minority participants included sociocultural content in their definitions of female and male more 
frequently than cisgender sexual majorities and FB participants – including identity-related 
content – and therefore might still see these options as addressing identity. Future research might 
test directly how different language shapes participants’ affect and responses to gender/sex 
survey questions. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
One notable facet of my study that limits its generalizability is that I asked participants to 
generate their own gender/sex category definitions rather than asking them whether they would 
include specific kinds of biological or sociocultural content in each category. Therefore, some of 
the effects I found in the types of content participants included might reflect the extent to which 
that content was readily cognitively available for participants in the study. For instance, fewer 
than 10% of definitions of female/male included mentions of ovaries, testes, or gonads in 
general. It is likely that many more participants understand female/male to encompass gonads in 
their definitions and that this low number reflects that participants did not consider gonads to be 
as centrally important as other features (e.g., genitals, chromosomes). Other potential factors 
include prototypicality of particular features (e.g., genitals may be understood as more 
prototypical features than gonads, even if both are considered representative) and implicit use of 
metonymy (e.g., someone writing “vagina” might have imagined their response to also subsume 
vulva, ovaries, and uterus). Therefore, future research might benefit from presenting participants 
with a list of biological and sociocultural features and asking which features participants 
consider to fit into which categories. 
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Another reason participants might have chosen only to name few features in their 
definitions, even when they view many more as relevant, is for rhetorical purposes. For example, 
FB participants often defined woman and man as “adult human female” and “adult human male” 
respectively, mirroring some dictionary definitions (Woman, n.d.). Referencing this definition in 
contexts related to gender/sex diversity can rhetorically function to make gender/sex appear 
simple (i.e., identity as a woman or man is just a function of sex) and is a strategy employed by 
TERF adherents (Woman Billboard Removed after Transphobia Row, 2018). However, a 
definition like “adult human female” might imply certain biological features, but does not 
explicitly include them, and therefore my content analysis likely did not capture its full intention.  
 Another important limitation in the present study’s scope is that I focused on gender/sex 
category definitions rather than gender/sex language use. For instance, I did not ask individuals 
to interpret the meaning of gender/sex categories in different linguistic contexts, which might 
have allowed me to better understand how individuals actually use gender/sex terms when 
speaking or interpreting speech. Therefore, while the present study suggests that links between 
heterogeneity in gender/sex category definitions and variation in gender/sex language use might 
be a fruitful site for further inquiry, my data do not function as evidence for such links. 
 Finally, the present study used an online convenience sample, which limits its 
generalizability. For example, the gender/sex minority group was significantly younger than 
either of the gender/sex majority groups. It is possible that an older sample of gender/sex 
minority individuals would conceptualize gender/sex categories differently. And because all my 
recruitment occurred online, it is possible that my overall sample is much more active in online 
discussions about gender/sex than other members of their respective groups. For example, the 
men in my study might not be representative of men in general in the degree to which they think 
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about gender/sex – which might be exacerbated by the relatively small number of men in the 
study. Future research should explore variations in understandings of gender/sex language with 
more representative samples. 
Conclusion 
My research found evidence for patterns in individuals’ inclusion of biological and 
sociocultural content in their definitions of gender/sex categories and differences in definition 
content and complexity based on gender/sex and sexual minority/majority status. My study 
suggests that individuals generally perceive feminine/masculine as linked to sociocultural 
content, female/male as linked to biological content, and woman/man as composed of a mix of 
sociocultural and biological content. Cisgender individuals define woman/man and female/male 
in ways that are less complex, more inclusive of biological content, and less inclusive of 
sociocultural content than transgender individuals, although this effect varies based on cisgender 
individuals’ sexual identities (and also whether they participate in online discussions of TERF 
ideology). I conclude that contemporary understandings of gender/sex categories are 
heterogeneous and not inevitably aligned with the natural attitude about gender.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Avalanche Samples: Gender/Sex Majorities’ Motivated Disruption of Gender/Sex Diversity 
Research 
Diversity research that catches the ire of over-empowered majorities with ideological 
objections to its content can be subject to backlash via attempts to disrupt the research process. 
Online survey research might be particularly at risk for disruption by groups of majorities who 
organize together via social movement online communities, and who might participate in 
diversity research to mock, challenge, and/or delegitimize it (Caren et al., 2012). Indeed, an 
organized group of gender/sex majorities participated in my online survey research on individual 
variation in people’s definitions of gender/sex categories (specifically, woman, man, feminine, 
masculine, female, and male) with the expressed intent of challenging what they perceived as my 
study’s political bias in favor of gender/sex diversity (see Chapter 2; Schudson et al., 2019). 
In this chapter, I delineate how gender/sex majorities organized to disrupt my research, 
and I analyze the implications of their actions for understanding majority opposition to diversity 
research more broadly. I describe how individual and group emotions, entitlement based on 
social location via race/ethnicity and education, and resistance to the content of the targeted 
research might motivate majorities to engage in disruptive actions. Finally, I explore the scope of 
majority disruption beyond my own research and consider future directions.  
Majorities’ Motivated Disruption of my Research 
 People involved in Facebook discussion groups centering trans-exclusionary radical 
feminism (TERF; see Goldberg, 2014; Watson, 2016) participated en masse in my research on
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gender/sex category definitions (n = 170; see Chapter 2). TERF ideology involves the belief that 
transgender individuals are members of their sex assigned at birth rather than their present 
gender/sex. Notably, the term “radical” in “TERF” refers to a historical connection to radical 
feminism rather than TERF politics actually being a radical challenge to patriarchy. I refer to 
TERF politics as reactionary throughout because of their investment in sustaining an oppressive 
status quo. Participants from Facebook TERF discussion groups (or “FB participants”) indicated 
in free-response items that their decision to participate was motivated by ideological opposition 
to my research.  
FB participants comprised nearly one-third of the total number of people that interacted 
with my survey (N = 516; 307 of which completed the survey, including 120 FB participants). 
They largely completed the survey as intended. Most, but not all, responded in appropriate ways 
to each question rather than with jokes, insults, or other unusable data. The survey asked 
participants to provide their own definitions of six gender/sex terms – woman, man, feminine, 
masculine, female, and male – without consulting a dictionary or other source. Most FB 
participants defined woman and man as “adult human female” and “adult human male” 
respectively, in accordance with the most common dictionary definitions and provided a range of 
definitions for the other terms. Therefore, although FB participants’ participation was unsolicited 
and evinced their resistance to the framing of my study, their data were still usable. 
In order to determine what FB participants’ data meant and how to incorporate them, it 
was important to understand how FB participants came to participate in my survey and why. I 
first became aware of the issue because the influx of FB participants was unusually rapid. Of the 
170 FB participants who started the survey, 154 participated within a three-day period, which 
was an order of magnitude faster than my intentional recruitment methods. I was then able to 
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determine that these participants were referred to the study from Facebook through Qualtrics, the 
online survey platform I used for this study. Notably, I did not post the link to the study on 
Facebook. Based on FB participants’ qualitative responses, I surmised that a participant 
encountered the survey link somewhere I had posted it (i.e., Craigslist) and then reposted the link 
in at least one TERF Facebook discussion group. Then, that participant or others continued to 
distribute it in TERF groups.  
These TERF Facebook discussion groups function as social movement online 
communities: group members connect with one another and act collectively based on shared 
goals of advancing TERF ideology and opposing sociopolitical inclusion of trans people (Caren 
et al., 2012). Sharing my study link among themselves was one such collective action. Had I 
encouraged participants to share the study link with their personal networks, this would simply 
constitute the common method of respondent-driven sampling (also known as “snowball 
sampling”). However, because this practice of sharing the study on Facebook was unsolicited, 
rapid, and had disruptive effects on the study, it can be understood not as respondent-driven but 
rather respondent-controlled – or, what I refer to as an “avalanche sample.” 
Many participants in the avalanche sample noted that they perceived my project as 
“biased” (i.e., ideologically positioned in a way that they oppose) due to my use of terms like 
“cisgender,” “gender/sex,” and “sex assigned at birth” in demographic questions. Certainly, like 
all research, my research is ideologically situated. And they were partially correct in their 
assessment of the ideological positioning of my study: language used to describe gender/sex 
diversity is politically contested because gender/sex minority identities and experiences are 
presently politically contested (e.g., discriminatory policies in the U.S. that regulate gender/sex 
minorities’ access to public spaces and define gender/sex minority identities as illegitimate; Fogg 
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Davis, 2018; Minter, 2016; van Anders et al., 2017). In my research in general, and in this study, 
I advocate for understanding and acceptance of gender/sex diversity in my research. I phrased 
survey items based on extant best practices for describing gender/sex diversity (e.g., using terms 
like “cisgender,” “gender/sex,” and “sex assigned at birth,” which TERF adherents oppose). 
However, I do not view my position as “biased” in the sense of containing an unfounded and 
unjustifiable slant in ideology. I follow feminist science studies scholars who show that all 
scientists work from a particular standpoint, and that the goal of science is not bias-free 
objectivity but rather a reflexive, situated approach that facilitates modest, well-supported 
knowledge claims over universalist accounts of phenomena (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 2004). 
 The avalanche sample did not fully derail my research, but it did have certain disruptive 
effects. For example, I intended to statistically compare the types of features mentioned in 
gender/sex category definitions by different social groups, including gender/sex and sexual 
minorities and majorities. However, FB participants varied systematically from other groups in 
their social group composition. Among these who provided demographic information, 
participants were mostly women (n = 98) and some men (n = 6). They identified as lesbian/gay 
(n = 44), heterosexual (n = 39), bisexual (n = 18), used another label (n = 8), used multiple labels 
(n = 3), or provided a detailed explanation of their sexualities (n = 3). While adherents to TERF 
ideology can be of any gender/sex or sexual identity, they are most commonly women and/or 
sexual minorities3 (Goldberg, 2014), and this was reflected in the FB group in my study. 
 
3 I refer to FB participants as gender/sex majorities despite the fact that many have minoritized 
social positions (in particular, as women and/or bisexual and lesbian/gay people). This is because 
“majority” is a contextually specific term. In the context of this study, a relevant aspect of these 
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Importantly, the converse is not true: there is no evidence to suggest that a significant proportion 
of women and/or sexual minorities endorse TERF ideology. Therefore, including FB participants 
in analyses comparing women and men, or sexual minorities and sexual majorities, was likely to 
be misleading and over-represent TERF ideology. I decided to include the FB group in analyses 
separately from the rest of the sample for exploratory purposes, which allowed me to still 
conduct the group comparisons I had originally planned. 
Motivations for Disrupting Diversity-Centered Research 
FB participants’ comments indicated that they perceived my study and what it 
symbolized (i.e., growing acceptance of gender/sex diversity) as threatening and were thus 
motivated to disrupt its imagined political agenda. My initial reaction to the avalanche sample 
consisted of wondering “Why me? Why my study?” And although I meant those questions 
rhetorically and self-pityingly, they are useful to answer in earnest. I did not have data to address 
the “Why me?” question; how FB participants imagined me was generally unclear from what 
they wrote. But, I was able to draw some preliminary conclusions about the “Why my study?” 
question from FB participants’ expressed affect, antipathy toward social change, and their social 
identities. 
Affect and Collective Action.  
One way to understand FB participants’ motivations is by examining the affect 
underlying their responses to open-ended questions at the end of the survey (e.g., “If you 
encountered any problems with this survey, or if you would like to give additional comments, 
 
participants’ social positions is as cisgender or otherwise non-transgender individuals who 
endorse biologically essentialist, anti-trans ideology. 
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please provide them here”). For instance, one FB participant wrote, “Losing sex segregated 
spaces and legislating personal identity as law is very scary for me. I want my granddaughters to 
be allowed to choose if they want to allow males into their showers, social events and academic 
institutions.” Importantly, my survey does not have any items related to legislation or sex-
segregated spaces and institutions. Regardless, the questions I did ask (e.g., personal definitions 
of gender/sex categories) seemed to cue this participant to express their fears about how 
acceptance of gender/sex diversity might change their social world. Similarly, one of the FB 
participants who seemed to approve of the survey wrote: 
“I am very concerned about the removal of the category of female as a discrete sex class, 
and worry what this means for women and girls around the world in the medium and long 
term, when there is no longer a term to describe ‘people with vaginas’. Or will we have to 
be called ‘people with [vaginas]’? That doesn't feel particularly progressive to me.  Good 
luck with your study.” 
Again, this participant expressed their anxiety (i.e., “very concerned,” “worry”) about what they 
perceived as the negative impact of gender/sex inclusive linguistic shifts. It is unclear in both of 
these participants’ comments whether they perceived me, as the researcher, as someone 
advocating for “the removal of the category of female” or “legislating personal identity,” or 
whether they viewed me as a current or potential future political ally. Many other FB participants 
wrote clearly negative, sometimes angry comments that suggested they viewed me as a 
gender/sex diversity advocate trying and failing to conceal my bias (e.g., “By offering gender/sex 
as a unified concept your bias is showing. Big time”).  
Regardless of the valence of FB participants’ comments, their responses indicated that 
the survey’s content elicited strong feelings of fear and/or anger. Anger in particular is an 
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approach-related emotion (e.g., toward confrontation, problem-solving) and can help motivate 
collective action (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2004). It is possible that 
anger and/or fear might spread within social movement online communities via emotional 
contagion, including synchronized online behavior (Hatfield et al., 1993). And when anger is 
directed at research that is perceived as biased and one in which participation as an intervention 
is feasible (e.g., an online survey), this might trigger an avalanche sample. Also, certain emotions 
might be more likely to trigger an avalanche sample than others. For example, it is possible that 
some emotions (e.g., surprise) might trigger mockery or disdain in private discussions, but not 
spur direct intervention. Future meta-research should investigate the affective underpinnings of 
organized disruption of research studies. 
Whiteness and Attitudes about Science 
In addition to emotions underlying participants’ comments, there are also trait-level 
characteristics of the FB participants that might also help explain the occurrence of an avalanche 
sample, including the fact that most were white (n = 111; 87% of those who indicated their 
race/ethnicity) and had high levels of formal education, including a four-year college degree 
and/or some form of graduate training (n = 95; 79% of those who indicated their education 
history). FB participants were not disproportionately white relative to the full sample; but 
regardless, whiteness and education history might have important implications for FB 
participants’ relationship to social science research. For example, Black and white people differ 
in the extent to which they trust science and participate in science and related institutions (e.g., 
medicine) (Brandon, Isaac, & LaVeist, 2005). 
Indeed, the processes through which minorities become minoritized and by which that 
minoritization is sustained are often contingent upon modes of science that legitimize dominant 
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ideologies. For example, biological and social science about race have both been instrumental to 
anti-Black cultural sentiment and state violence (e.g., eugenics and sociological research 
pathologizing Black American families; Kevles, 1995; Mumford, 2012). Potentially as a result of 
this history, Black Americans endorse choice-based explanations of race, gender, and varied 
psychological constructs (e.g., math aptitude) more than white people, who prefer genetic or 
culturally essentialist explanations (Cole et al., 2007; Jayaratne et al., 2009). Both genetic and 
culturally essentialist beliefs are premised in lay perceptions of scientific truths. For example, 
believing that Black culture or Black people’s DNA are the foundation of racial inequities relies 
on implicit scientific arguments (and sometimes cite flawed, published scientific research). This 
evidence supports the potential existence of a link between whiteness and beliefs about science – 
including institutional science and/or lay understandings of science – as essential to 
understanding social phenomena. 
I posit that the whiteness and high levels of formal education of the FB sample might 
help explain these participants’ investment in science as an institution. FB participants who 
perceived me as a biased advocate for gender/sex minorities might have understood themselves 
to be protecting the sanctity of science as an inherently good institution. Alternatively, they 
might have simply hoped to harness the power of institutionally supported science to promulgate 
their beliefs further. Regardless, their actions indicated that they cared enough about the outcome 
of my research to intervene in it. It is possible that they were correct to care about my research – 
after all, institutionally supported science has historically held significant power in the U.S. At 
the same time, their actions reflect an anxiety that, without their interference, science might 
proceed down the “wrong” path and re-entrench the “wrong” ideas.  
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FB participants’ fear of the potential of science to cause harm might reflect the 
complexity of their experiences as women and/or sexual minorities. As people who are 
marginalized for their gender/sexes and/or sexual orientations, they might be wary of the 
negative impact science can have on minoritized groups and fear for their own groups at the 
expense of others (i.e., gender/sex minorities). Simultaneously, as white and/or formally 
educated people, they might see science as an inherently good enterprise in need of their 
stewardship and protection from biased researchers. Further empirical work is necessary to 
understand the relationship between social location, attitudes about science, and perceived ability 
to influence scientific knowledge among TERF adherents and other reactionary groups that 
organize to disrupt diversity-centered research online. 
Social Change and Status Threat 
Finally, it is important to attend to the specific types of social change that FB participants 
feared (e.g., gender-neutral language and spaces) to better understand what kinds of social issues 
might motivate majority disruption of research. Fear and anger toward gender-neutral language 
and spaces is a form of antipathy toward social change, and FB participants’ language suggested 
they perceived these issues as urgent social threats with far-reaching effects (e.g., “[I] worry 
what this means for women and girls around the world in the medium and long term”). The 
inclusion of gender-neutral language in a scientific study might have been especially threatening 
to FB participants who believe in the power of science to legitimize certain frameworks, 
including minoritized frameworks. That is, FB participants might have worried that my research 
would be published in scientific journals and/or disseminated to the public, which might further 
legitimize gender/sex diversity frameworks (which they erroneously perceived as inaccurate and 
sexist). 
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The threat that particular linguistic cues in my study induced for FB participants might 
have been an especially strong motivating factor for the avalanche sample. Majorities’ support 
for hierarchy and majority group dominance is heightened when they perceive social threats 
(Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). For instance, men’s gender essentialism (i.e., beliefs that gender 
differences are real, natural, and immutable) is only associated with sexism when men are 
presented with information suggesting that the gap between men’s and women’s social statuses 
is closing (Morton et al., 2009). These findings suggest that when majorities believe minorities 
are gaining higher status, they endorse ideologies that justify the existing status differential from 
which they benefit. It is possible that TERF adherents, and potentially cisgender individuals 
more broadly, also experience similar threats when reading gender-neutral and/or inclusive 
language and are motivated to protect their social status. And while most prior research on 
gender-based social threats are about men’s masculinity (see Vandello & Bosson, 2013), 
gender/sex diversity related social threats might be salient for cisgender women too, who socially 
benefit from their majority status as cisgender. Future empirical work should investigate the role 
of status threat in motivating collective action among gender/sex majorities.  
Majorities’ Disruptive Actions in Other Online Contexts 
Was my experience with the avalanche sample of supporters of TERF ideology unique? 
Or have other researchers had similar experiences? And, if so, which researchers and for which 
kinds of research? Prior literature on disruptive participation in psychology is sparse, particularly 
for Internet-based and/or survey research. However, I have spoken to other researchers studying 
gender/sex diversity and transgender identity/experience who have encountered similar issues. 
For instance, the U.S. Trans Survey had issues with avalanche samples of TERF adherents, 
similar to my study (A. Flores, personal communication, Aug 1, 2017).  I learned about instances 
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like this one because they involved TERF adherents specifically, and either I or my advisor (Dr. 
van Anders) were put in touch with these researchers. It remains unclear whether majority 
interference in diversity-centered social science research is a strategy specific to TERF 
adherents, or if other organized groups of majority individuals use this strategy also (e.g., white 
supremacists disrupting research on racial/ethnic diversity). 
Outside of research contexts, there is evidence of reactionary social movement online 
communities other than TERF adherents performing disruptive collection actions. These 
reactionary groups include participants in the “manosphere” (e.g., men’s rights activists) and 
white supremacists (Caren et al., 2012; Heikkilä, 2017; Marwick & Caplan, 2018). Some forms 
of Internet-based collective action that mirror avalanche samples include e-mail bombs (van Laer 
& van Aelst, 2010), in which participants flood a target email server to show the magnitude of 
opposition to a specific policy, action, individual, etc., and brigades (Heikkilä, 2017), in which 
group members collectively perform a disruptive action such as leaving comments on articles, 
attempting to sway opinion polls, or harassing individuals. Brigades are functionally similar to 
avalanche samples: a member of a social movement online community directs other members to 
interact in a specific way with an ideologically opposed target.  
Notably, tactics such as e-mail bombs, brigades, and avalanche samples might be used for 
achieving either progressive or reactionary goals. My study was disrupted by reactionary groups 
opposed to the expansion of gender-based protections for gender/sex minorities, but it is 
conceivable that social movement online communities that include and/or center gender/sex 
minorities might organize to disrupt research that is linked to restricting rights for gender/sex 
minorities. Fundamentally, an avalanche sample is a form of digital, research-based protest, and 
protest can be used to promote social progress or call for a reversion to a more unequal past. It 
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remains an empirical question which social movement online communities actually use 
avalanche sampling as a tactic, for what purposes, and whether their goals are ever to protect 
social progress rather than backlash against the expansion of rights for minoritized groups. 
Based on my experiences, I posit that the avalanche sample might be a more ambivalent 
tactic than other collective actions from social movement online communities, like email bombs 
or brigades. For instance, some FB participants indicated approval of my research in their 
responses to open-ended questions and perceived it as important and/or aligned with their values 
(although most did not). And the vast majority of FB individuals participated in good faith; they 
responded to questions in ways that were coherent and reflective of their opinions. In contrast, 
the avalanche sample in the U.S. Trans Survey functioned as a sort of data vandalism: TERF 
adherents responded randomly to lower the overall quality of data and researchers had to perform 
careful data cleaning procedures to mitigate their impact (A. Flores, personal communication, 
Aug 1, 2017).  
In sum, the scope of the problem of majority interference remains unclear and a 
generative topic for further meta-research on researchers’ experiences. Open questions include 
whether organized disruption of diversity-centered research is a strategy unique to TERF 
adherents (and if so, why) and what features of research surveys might trigger avalanche 
samples. 
Conclusion 
TERF adherents organized to participate en masse in my research about variation in 
gender/sex category definitions in order to assert the dominance of their biologically essentialist 
beliefs. This particular form of motivated, majority disruption of research, which I have labeled 
an avalanche sample, represents a concerning and understudied methodological obstacle for 
   48 
online survey research. Although I have communicated with a few other researchers who have 
had similar issues with TERF adherents disrupting their research related to gender/sex diversity, 
it remains unclear how widespread this issue is and whether social movement online 
communities other than TERF adherents use similar tactics to disrupt research. The avalanche 
sample of TERF adherents might have been spurred to action by anger, fear, reverence for 
“objective” science that legitimizes dominant frameworks, and the severity of the perceived 
social threat my research represented to them. More meta-research is necessary to understand the 
factors that drive organized groups of majorities to disrupt particular diversity-centered research 
projects. As online-based recruitment becomes increasingly normative in the social sciences and 
research on gender/sex diversity grows, it is important for researchers to be prepared to manage 
backlash.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs: Scale Construction, Validation, and Links to Prejudice 
 In Chapter 2, I found evidence of variation in people’s understandings of gender/sex 
categories. This research suggested that heterogeneity in gender/sex diversity beliefs is evident in 
how people define gender/sex categories. In Chapter 4, I describe the construction and validation 
of the Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale (GSDB). In tandem with changes in public awareness 
of gender/sex minority identities, there has been increased scholarly attention to social 
constructionist perspectives on gender/sex, which often position gender/sex as a diverse, 
socioculturally contingent, and non-binary category (e.g., Lloyd & Galupo, 2019; Richards et al., 
2016; Schudson, Beischel, & van Anders, 2019; Zimman, 2017). Historically, scholars have 
described normative lay beliefs about gender/sex as essentialist, meaning they are premised in 
the belief that gender/sex has a singular, underlying reality that cannot be changed (Bettcher, 
2007; Garfinkel, 1967; Gelman, 2003; Kessler & McKenna, 2000; Rubin, 1975; Tee & Hegarty, 
2006). But, psychological research on emergent, social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex 
diversity is still nascent. Accordingly, in this chapter, I ask: What is the latent structure of 
contemporary social constructionist and essentialist beliefs about the nature of gender/sex 
diversity? And might gender/sex diversity beliefs be meaningfully associated with people’s 
attitudes about gender/sex minorities? 
Essentialism and Prejudice against Gender/Sex Minorities
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Prior research on essentialist beliefs about gender/sex has often focused on beliefs about 
whether differences between (typically implicitly) cisgender women and men are natural and 
biologically based (Coleman & Hong, 2008; Haslam et al., 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2006; 
Smiler & Gelman, 2008). This research has yielded many important insights about the 
relationship between gender/sex essentialism and sexism. However, it has also typically 
presupposed that all people understand “women” and “men” as natural kinds (i.e., 
metaphysically discrete, inevitable categories) with self-evident members and non-members. In 
effect, less research has explicitly examined heterogeneity in people’s beliefs about whether 
“women” and “men” are natural kinds and the extent to which they are diversely structured and 
malleable categories (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Natural kind beliefs are especially relevant to 
prejudice and stigma toward gender/sex minorities and as such, they require greater empirical 
attention. For example, discriminatory policies aimed at regulating transgender people’s access 
to gendered public spaces have been premised in beliefs about female and male as fundamentally 
discrete, immutable categories (van Anders et al., 2014, 2017). 
Some recent studies that have examined links between essentialism and prejudice against 
gender/sex minorities have found that essentialism is linked to trans-prejudice (i.e., prejudice 
against transgender people) and support of anti-trans public policies (Callahan & Zukowski, 
2019; Ching & Xu, 2018; Roberts et al., 2017; Wilton et al., 2018). Notably, these studies have 
typically used generalized measures of essentialism (i.e., endorsement of essentialist beliefs 
about social categories broadly) or measures of gender/sex essentialism that only consider 
differences between implicitly cisgender women and men. General measures of essentialism of 
social categories or measures that do not clearly implicate gender/sex minority identities are not 
fully acceptable substitutes for a measure of essentialist beliefs about gender/sex minorities 
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because individuals can have essentialist beliefs about some social categories and not others 
(Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002).  
Measures that have explicitly assessed natural kind beliefs focused on the nature of 
gender/sex minority and majority identities (e.g., endorsement of a gender/sex binary) have 
found strong links to trans-prejudice and social policies that affect gender/sex minorities (Clark 
& Hughto, 2019; Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Kanamori et al., 2017; Norton & Herek, 2013; Tee 
& Hegarty, 2006). However, some have used insufficiently validated measures (see Billard, 
2018; Morrison et al., 2017). And none have systematically examined essentialist and social 
constructionist beliefs about gender/sex minorities based on the multiple dimensions of 
psychological essentialism (Haslam et al., 2000; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). For instance, perhaps 
the most widely used trans-prejudice scale, the genderism and transphobia scale (GTS; Hill & 
Willoughby, 2005) includes a few essentialist beliefs about gender/sex (e.g., “People are either 
men or women”). However, other than those few items, the GTS largely assesses beliefs about 
the normality and acceptability of gender nonconformity and interpersonal behaviors and 
attitudes. Other scales also mix together some essentialist beliefs about gender/sex with self-
reported behavioral tendencies and attitudes toward transgender individuals and other 
gender/sexes  (Kanamori et al., 2017; Nagoshi et al., 2008; Walch, Ngamake, et al., 2012). 
Billard (2018) advocated for the creation of new trans-prejudice scales with greater clarity in 
conceptualizations of transgender people, consistent use of attitudinal items instead of mixing in 
behavioral items, and avoidance of language that might reinforce participants’ stigmatizing 
views (e.g., through misgendering).  
In parallel to Billard’s (2018) suggestion of greater precision in how we measure trans-
prejudice, I propose precision in what we measure to understand attitudes relevant to trans-
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prejudice. Specifically, I propose that measuring cognitive components of prejudice (e.g., 
essentialist and social constructionist beliefs) separately from affective components (e.g., fear, 
disgust, hate) will allow us to better understand their relationship with one another and with 
relevant outcomes (Stangor et al., 1991; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005a; Zajonc, 1980). Prior scales, 
like the GTS, have included a small number of essentialist and social constructionist beliefs 
about gender/sex diversity alongside affective prejudice toward gender/sex minorities, which 
might reflect an implicit assumption that the affective and cognitive components are closely 
associated. But, measuring essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex 
diversity separately from affective trans-prejudice is necessary for investigation of which beliefs 
about the nature of gender/sex undergird affective prejudice or affirmation. 
Importantly, although I distinguish between beliefs about gender/sex diversity and 
attitudes about gender/sex minorities, I approach both concepts as possessing linked functions 
for perceivers. Psychologists have distinguished (or not distinguished) between attitudes and 
beliefs in different ways, although typically they have conceptualized attitudes as evaluative and 
beliefs as descriptive (Fishbein, 1963). Some have challenged the boundary between attitudes 
and beliefs and demonstrated how both beliefs and attitudes serve interwoven functions for 
perceivers, rather than existing in concrete form, like possessions (Abelson & Prentice, 1989). 
Although the beliefs on which I focus are primarily descriptive, I examine a highly diverse set of 
beliefs and approach them from this functionalist perspective. My investigation takes as a 
premise that descriptive beliefs about the nature of gender/sex are not static cognitive entities, 
but rather might be contextually deployed (or disavowed) to serve particular inter- and 
intrapersonal functions, such as appearing non-prejudiced or communicating social or political 
group affiliation (Hegarty & Golden, 2008). 
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Affirming Perspectives on Gender/Sex Diversity  
Social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex might be especially central to affirming 
perspectives on gender/sex diversity. Gender/sex diversity affirmation involves the 
acknowledgment and/or acceptance of the existence of many and varied gender/sexes. Social 
constructionist beliefs position gender/sex as not defined by an inherent essence and subject to 
change over time for individuals and societies, among other beliefs. Social constructionist beliefs 
are present both within and beyond queer, feminist, and/or academic contexts, and are 
particularly salient in gender/sex minority communities (Zimman, 2017). And, with the recent 
increase in attention to gender/sex diversity in media coverage and political discourse, it is 
possible that they are more common among gender/sex majorities than previously thought. 
Although many social constructionist beliefs are theoretically linked to gender/sex 
diversity affirmation, social constructionist beliefs are not the only basis for positive attitudes 
toward gender/sex minorities. Certain essentialist beliefs might actually be too: in particular, 
beliefs that essentialize gender/sex minority identities as natural kinds, rather than only “female” 
and “male.” For instance, believing the female/male binary is natural, rather than socially 
produced, is essentialist and is associated with prejudice (Norton & Herek, 2013; Tee & Hegarty, 
2006). On the other hand, believing transgender identities are natural and immutable is also 
essentialist, but might actually be associated with affirmation. This bifurcated relationship to 
prejudice across essentialism of minority identities and essentialism of group differences 
functions similarly for sexual orientation, but not for binary gender/sex (i.e., a lens focused on 
women and men only) or race/ethnicity (Grzanka et al., 2016; Haslam et al., 2002; Jayaratne et 
al., 2009; Nagoshi et al., 2008; Tawa, 2017). 
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Why are some kinds of essentialist beliefs positively associated with attitudes about 
gender/sex and sexual minorities, but the same is not true for attitudes about women and/or 
racial/ethnic minorities?  Racial/ethnic and binary gender/sex groups are normatively viewed as 
natural kinds, and oppression of women and/or racial/ethnic minorities has frequently relied on 
justifying these groups’ subordination to men and/or white people by naturalizing group 
differences (Haslam et al., 2000; Mahalingam, 2007; Morton et al., 2009; Ryazanov & 
Christenfeld, 2018). Conversely, gender/sex and sexual minority identities have been constructed 
as pathologies more so than natural kinds (Ansara & Hegarty, 2012; Haslam et al., 2000; Herek, 
2007). Therefore, essentialist accounts of gender/sex and sexual minority identities as natural and 
immutable can have disruptive effects on the status quo and have been rhetorically important to 
many contemporary sexual and gender minority social movements (although essentialist 
accounts are also exclusionary of sexual and gender/sex minorities who do not experience their 
identities as immutable or as natural kinds; Diamond & Rosky, 2016; Grzanka et al., 2016; 
Hegarty, 2002). In sum, the relationship between prejudice and essentialism is contingent on 
both which group is being essentialized and also which aspects of a group are being essentialized 
(e.g., minority identities or group differences). So, when minority gender/sexes are essentialized 
– rather than binary gender/sex or differences between women and men – essentialism might be 
negatively linked to prejudice. 
The Present Research 
I aimed to design the Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale (GSDB) to measure both 
essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex that are pertinent to attitudes about 
gender/sex minorities. My goals included: (a) Constructing a valid, reliable scale that can be used 
broadly in research on gender/sex diversity and/or prejudice, (b) Determining the latent structure 
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of gender/sex essentialism as it pertains to gender/sex minorities, rather than just cisgender 
women and men, and (c) Assessing how various gender/sex diversity beliefs link to prejudice 
against gender/sex minorities and gender/sex attitudes more broadly. I conducted three studies to 
address my goals: In Study 1, I created a preliminary version of the GSDB and did an 
exploratory study to determine its factor structure. In Study 2, I assessed the stability of the 
factor structure via confirmatory factor analysis and examined criterion-related validity, 
including links between the GSDB and prejudice against gender/sex minorities and measures 
establishing concurrent and divergent validity. Finally, in Study 3, I established the test-retest 
reliability of the GSDB. Ultimately, I intended for my research to illuminate variation in current 
understandings of the nature of gender/sex and its implications for prejudice and affirmation of 
gender/sex minorities. 
Item Generation and Refinement 
Content Categories  
I developed content categories to guide item generation for the GSDB based on a review 
of prior literature on essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about social categories, as well 
as literature on attitudes and beliefs about gender/sex minorities. These content categories 
represented different aspects of people’s beliefs about gender/sex diversity. The purpose of 
developing content categories was not to facilitate predictions for a latent structure for the 
GSDB, but rather to help generate items that were appropriately representative of the range of 
essentialist and social constructionist beliefs individuals might have about gender/sex diversity. 
Most content categories mirrored the dimensions of essentialism outlined by Haslam et 
al. (2000), but item generation was also shaped by scholarship related to prejudice against 
gender/sex minorities (e.g., Bettcher, 2007; Currah & Moore, 2009; van Anders et al., 2014). I 
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derived eight content categories from prior theory about essentialism of social categories: (1) 
Immutability (aspects of gender/sex cannot change), (2) Necessity (certain features are necessary 
for gender/sex category membership), (3) Naturalness (aspects of gender/sex are natural), (4) 
Inherence (aspects of gender/sex have a deep-seated reality), (5) Informativeness (aspects of 
gender/sex allow for accurate inferences about people), (6) Uniformity (people of the same 
gender/sex are similar), (7) Exclusivity (gender/sex is binary and categories are mutually 
exclusive), and (8) Cultural/Historical Stability (gender/sex categories are the same across 
cultures and historical periods). For all categories, I included both essentialist and social 
constructionist beliefs. 
In addition to the above, I included items in two novel categories: Authenticity (some 
gender/sex category members are more real or authentic than others) and Eliminativism (getting 
rid of aspects of gender/sex from society is desirable). I included Authenticity because theory 
and historical evidence alike suggest that beliefs about gender/sex minorities’ identities being 
inauthentic or fraudulent are especially salient and are strongly tied to prejudice (Bettcher, 2007; 
Currah & Moore, 2009). I included eliminativism because of my interest in representing a broad 
range of social constructionist beliefs in addition to essentialist beliefs, and because 
eliminativism is a salient part of scholarly and popular discourses about feminism and gender/sex 
diversity (Koenig & Richeson, 2010; Mikkola, 2017).  
Content Validity 
 Concurrent with development of the content categories, I generated an extensive list of 
items to populate each category. Dr. van Anders and I discussed and refined the list. Then, 
several undergraduate and graduate lab members offered suggestions on items, and I refined the 
list further. 
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I consulted gender/sex minority individuals to help establish content validity of scale 
items (Morrison et al., 2017). Gender/sex minority individuals who have critically engaged with 
their social positions can possess especially valuable perspectives on gender/sex diversity that I 
might not, as a cisgender person (Harding, 2004). Transgender, non-binary, and gender/sex 
diverse individuals (N = 10) were recruited via a post on my personal Facebook page to provide 
feedback on scale items via an online survey. Individuals rated each item on two Likert-style 5-
point scales assessing the item’s relevance to the scale and its clarity in phrasing and meaning. 
Individuals also were able to give qualitative feedback about each content category and 
commented on the representativeness of the whole scale to beliefs about gender/sex diversity. 
Individuals were compensated with $50 Amazon gift cards for their time and expertise. I revised 
scale items based on individuals’ ratings and qualitative feedback, focusing on items that had a 
low mean rating (i.e., less than 4.0) for relevance and/or clarity. 
Next, I solicited feedback from academic experts on essentialism, trans-prejudice, and/or 
non-binary gender/sex (N = 8; see Acknowledgments section). Academic experts did not receive 
financial compensation. I used the same online survey, and again I revised items with low 
relevance and/or clarity ratings and based on qualitative feedback. In addition to other revisions, 
academic experts’ feedback led to the removal of one content category labeled “Social 
Significance,” which I originally created to address beliefs about power, privilege, and 
oppression, but feedback suggested was too conceptually distinct from essentialist and social 
constructionist beliefs and potentially difficult for many cisgender participants to understand. 
After this last round of revisions, I had an 86-item list which I used in Study 1 (Appendix A). 
Study 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
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The goals of my first study were to determine the factor structure of the GSDB and to 
reduce the preliminary item list to a shorter final list. I also intended to examine the GSDB’s 
concurrent validity with transphobia and divergent validity with social desirability. I predicted 
that GSDB factors would correlate moderately highly with transphobia, which would support the 
idea that the GSDB measures related but separable constructs. 
Participants 
I recruited participants (N = 304) from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) using 
CloudResearch, which allowed me to recruit experienced MTurk workers (i.e., minimum of 100 
tasks and task approval rate of 95%; Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017; Peer, Vosgerau, & 
Acquisti, 2014). MTurk samples provide greater validity for research on sociopolitical attitudes 
than other convenience sample alternatives (e.g., introductory psychology students), particularly 
due to greater variation in age, socioeconomic status, and geographic location (Clifford et al., 
2015). Participants were recruited to participate in a 15-20 minute online survey about how they 
think about gender. I had less than 1% missing data on the GSDB; only one participant had > 5% 
missing data and therefore was excluded, leaving a final sample size of N = 303 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2013). I performed expectation maximization to impute missing values. Participants 
ranged in age from 19 to 72 (M = 34.4, SD = 10.2). See Table 3.1 for demographics. 
Measures 
Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale (GSDB) 
Participants completed the 86-item version of the GSDB. Items included essentialist and 
social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex from 10 content categories (Immutability, 
Authenticity, Necessity, Naturalness, Inherence, Informativeness, Uniformity, Exclusivity, 
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Eliminativism, Cultural/Historical Stability). Participants rated their agreement with each item on 
a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
Genderism and Transphobia Scale—Revised (GTS-R; α = .96; Hill & Willoughby, 2005; 
Tebbe, Moradi, & Ege, 2014).  
The GTS-R is a 22-item version of the GTS which consists of transphobia/genderism (17 
items) and gender-bashing (5 items) factors. Transphobia/genderism items cover moral 
opposition to gender variance, discomfort, and disgust (e.g., “If I found out that my best friend 
were changing their sex, I would freak out” and “Masculine women make me feel 
uncomfortable”). Gender-bashing items cover violent behaviors toward transgender and 
gender/sex diverse individuals (e.g., “I have beat up men who act like sissies”). Items are rated 
on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Reynolds, 
1982).  
Participants completed the 13-item short form C of the MCSDS, which measures 
participants’ tendencies toward socially desirable responding. Items describe socially desirable 
but uncommon behaviors, such as “I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.” 
Participants rated whether each item was true or false of them. For each item, I coded the 
socially desirable option as 1 and the other option as 0. Participants’ responses were summed; 
higher scores reflect more socially desirable responding.  
Results 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 I conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using principal axis factoring extraction 
and a direct oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .95 
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and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p < .001), which indicates that the data are very 
well suited for factor analysis. Factor correlations were all low, so I performed the EFA again 
using a Varimax rotation; results presented here are from this second EFA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2013). 
The EFA extracted 15 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. In order to determine how 
many factors to retain, I conducted a parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000). The parallel analysis 
suggested a six-factor solution, with which I proceeded. This six-factor solution explained 
56.19% of the variance. I selected items for the final version of the scale based on three criteria: 
high factor loadings (all were greater than 0.5), low cross-loadings (all loadings were more than 
0.15 greater than the highest cross-loading), and parsimony (e.g., if two items fit the other 
criteria but were highly similar content-wise, only one was retained). 
The first factor, which I labeled “Affirmation,” had an eigenvalue of 31.98 and accounted 
for 37.19% of the variance. This factor included items from all content domains except 
Uniformity, Inherence, and Informativeness. Items associated with recognizing the existence of 
gender/sex diversity loaded positively; those associated with denying gender/sex diversity loaded 
negatively. I retained 14 items, including 1-3 items from each content category that loaded with 
the factor (i.e., Immutability, Necessity, Exclusivity, Cultural/Historical Stability, Naturalness, 
Authenticity, and Eliminativism). I included more items from content categories in which 
proportionally more items loaded very highly with the factor (e.g., Exclusivity), and fewer from 
those that had fewer items that loaded with the factor (e.g., Eliminativism). I only included items 
that loaded positively with the factor to maximize internal reliability and conceptual uniformity 
within the factor; this led to the factor being comprised primarily of social constructionist beliefs, 
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but also some essentialist beliefs about the naturalness and inherence of gender/sex minority 
identities. 
The second factor, which I labeled “Gender Normativity” had an eigenvalue of 6.13 and 
accounted for 7.13% of the variance. This factor consisted of items from the Necessity and 
Authenticity content categories about the importance of femininity for women and masculinity 
for men and the inauthenticity of non-normative gender expressions (e.g., feminine men). Four 
items were retained based on my criteria.  
The third factor, which I labeled “Uniformity,” had an eigenvalue of 3.54 and accounted 
for 4.12% of the variance. This factor consisted primarily of items from the Uniformity content 
category. It also included some Authenticity and Informativeness items, although factor loadings 
for these items were all moderate and all cross-loaded with other factors, so only Uniformity 
items were retained.  
The fourth factor, which I labeled “Surgery”, had an eigenvalue of 2.57 and explained 
2.99% of the variance. This factor consisted of two Authenticity items about genital surgery as a 
necessary precondition for a person to “truly” transition gender/sexes; both were retained. 
The fifth factor, which I labeled “Upbringing”, had an eigenvalue of 2.25 and explained 
2.61% of the variance. This factor consisted of three Immutability items about the role of 
upbringing and early experiences in determining gender/sex. I retained two of the three items; 
one was eliminated for parsimony.  
The sixth factor, which I labeled “Biology & Gender”, had an eigenvalue of 1.86 and 
explained 2.16% of the variance. This factor consisted of three Naturalness items about the role 
of biology in shaping gender (femininity, masculinity, and gender diversity). I retained two of 
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the three items; one item about the role of biology in non-binary identities was eliminated for a 
high, positive cross-loading with the Affirmation factor. 
I performed a final EFA on the retained items, which yielded the same 6 factor structure 
and explained 69.27% of the variance (Table 3.2). When performing the final EFA with a direct 
oblimin rotation, some of the factor correlations rose above the threshold for assuming 
orthogonality. However, the factor structure was the same regardless of whether I applied a 
direct oblimin or varimax rotation; the relative magnitude of eigenvalues for the second through 
sixth factors changed slightly when using the direct oblimin, but all items loaded with the same 
factors. Factor loadings listed in Table 3.2 are from the varimax rotation. 
Criterion-Related Validity   
I analyzed criterion-related validity of the GSDB by examining correlations between the 
GSDB factors, social desirability, and genderism/transphobia (Table 3.3). Most GSDB factors 
did not correlate with the social desirability, as expected. However, Gender Normativity and 
Uniformity each had small, significant positive correlations with social desirability (r = .12 for 
both).  
I observed significant correlations between all GSDB factors and genderism/transphobia 
except for the Upbringing (r = .06) and Biology & Gender (r = .10) factors. Notably, correlations 
varied from the moderate level I predicted (Uniformity, r = .52; Surgery, r = .45) to high 
(Affirmation, r = -.69; Gender Normativity, r = .80).  
Study Discussion 
 I tested the factor structure of the GSDB and derived a six-factor structure. One factor, 
Affirmation, explained the majority of the variance and included items from most content 
categories. Notably, the content categories that did not load with the Affirmation factor (i.e., 
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Informativeness, Inherence, and Uniformity) all are typically associated with entitativity beliefs 
(i.e., beliefs about groups as bounded, homogenous entities; Haslam et al., 2000). This might 
indicate that judgments of the entitativity of gender/sex minorities and majorities might not be an 
especially salient and/or coherent aspect of people’s beliefs about gender/sex diversity. Other 
factors included Gender Normativity, Uniformity, Surgery, Upbringing, and Biology & Gender. 
All factors except Upbringing and Biology & Gender were strongly associated with trans-
prejudice. Correlations between the Genderism and Transphobia Scale and the Affirmation and 
Gender Normativity factors were stronger than predicted. One possible explanation is that 
because the Genderism and Transphobia Scale measures both affective and cognitive prejudice 
toward transgender and gender/sex diverse individuals – including some essentialist beliefs – 
these factors actually are measuring overlapping constructs. Therefore, I decided to include 
purely affective measures of prejudice (i.e., feeling thermometers) in Study 2 to further assess 
the GSDB’s links to prejudice. Feeling thermometers also allowed me to examine GSDB factors’ 
links to different gender/sex groups separately. 
Study 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Criterion-Related Validity 
 My goals for my second study were to assess the stability of the GSDB factor structure 
with a new sample and to examine criterion-related validity with relevant personality variables 
and political ideologies. I also aimed to replicate my finding that some GSDB factors were 
linked to trans-prejudice and expand on it by examining links between the GSDB and feelings 
toward a range of different gender/sexes individually. 
Participants 
Again, I recruited participants (N = 300) from MTurk using CloudResearch. Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 72 (M = 37.8, SD = 12.1). See Table 3.1 for demographics. Participants 
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were recruited to participate in a 15-20 minute online survey about social and political beliefs. 
All items for all scales in the survey had less than 1% missing data; only one participant had > 
5% missing data and therefore was excluded, leaving a final sample size of N = 299. I performed 
expectation maximization to impute missing values.  
Measures 
Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale (α = .85) 
Participants completed a 27-item version of the GSDB (see Table 3.2 for item-level 
descriptive statistics). The distributions for all items were approximately normal, except for 
“Masculine women are not truly women” which displayed unacceptably high kurtosis; this item 
was deleted from the scale. Three other items were ultimately deleted from the scale (see 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Study 3). Internal reliabilities for final versions of individual 
factors were: α = 0.96 (Affirmation), α = 0.72 (Gender Normativity), α = 0.72 (Uniformity), α = 
0.91 (Surgery), α = 0.75 (Upbringing), and α = 0.78 (Biology & Gender).  
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; α = .94; Altemeyer, 1981; Zakrisson, 2005).  
RWA measures authoritarian attitudes and beliefs (e.g., “Our country desperately needs a 
mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness 
that are ruining us”). I chose to assess the concurrent validity of the GSDB with RWA because of 
evidence of strong links between RWA and essentialism  (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Keller, 2005). I 
used a 15-item revised version developed by Zakrisson (2005) to assess RWA in a form that is 
less contingent on attitudes toward specific groups (e.g., atheists, lesbian and gay individuals) 
than the original. Participants rated their feelings toward each item on a scale from 1 (very 
negative) to 7 (very positive).  
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; α = .95; Ho et al., 2015).  
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SDO assesses individuals’ general preference for or against social inequality. I used the 
SDO7, a 16-item scale. Items include: “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other 
groups” and “Inferior groups should stay in their place.” Participants are instructed to rate their 
feelings about each statement from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive). Similar to RWA, prior 
research has suggested positive links between SDO and essentialism (Haslam & Levy, 2006; 
Keller, 2005). 
Conservatism (α = .91; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  
Participants rated their political orientation on “foreign policy issues,” “economic issues,” 
and “social issues” separately, on a scale of 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative), with the 
midpoint labeled “middle of the road.” A composite conservatism score was calculated by 
averaging their scores on the 3 items.   
Need for Closure Scale (α = .92; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  
The Need for Closure (NFC) scale consists assesses individuals’ tolerance for ambiguity, 
decisiveness, closed-mindedness, and need for predictability and order. NFC has been described 
as a basic form of motivated cognition that leads to prejudice via essentialism (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2011a). I used a 15-item short version (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) which contains items 
including: “I dislike unpredictable situations” and “When I am confused about an important 
issue, I feel very upset.” Responses were measured via 6-point Likert scales (1 = completely 
disagree, 6 = completely agree).  
Gender Essentialism Scale (GES; α = .95; Skewes, Fine, & Haslam, 2018).  
The GES is a 25-item scale measuring essentialist beliefs about women and men. The 
GES focuses on beliefs about differences between women and men. For example, “Men and 
women have different abilities” and “Fathers have to learn what mothers are able to do 
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naturally.” I intended to assess whether the GES and GSDB measure divergent forms of 
gender/sex essentialism.  
Gender/Sex Feeling Thermometers 
Participants rated their feelings toward gender/sex groups on a scale from 0 to 100 and 
were instructed to imagine the scale as a thermometer, with higher numbers indicating warmth or 
favorability, and lower numbers indicating coldness or unfavorability (Norton & Herek, 2013). 
There were feeling thermometers for 11 gender/sex categories: cisgender women, cisgender men, 
non-binary individuals, transgender women, transgender men, women in general, men in general, 
feminine men, masculine men, feminine women, and masculine women. I chose these groups in 
order to separately assess attitudes toward various gender/sex minority and majority groups.  
Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
I conducted confirmatory factor analysis on the GSDB using MPlus version 8.2 (Muthén 
& Muthén, 2019). I tested multiple models, each using the ML estimator. In one model, I tested 
the factor structure I found in Study 1 (GSDB-Full), excluding the Biology & Gender factor 
which was dropped from the scale due to low test-retest reliability (see Study 3).4 I also analyzed 
the Affirmation factor on its own (GSDB-Affirm). I did so because I anticipate that some 
researchers who only want to measure affirming beliefs about gender/sex diversity might use the 
Affirmation factor on its own in future work (see General Discussion). Further, the Affirmation 
 
4 I originally tested the full six-factor model. However, following the exclusion of the Biology & 
Gender factor based on its low test-retest reliability in Study 3, I re-ran my models without that 
factor. All GSDB-Full results reported in this paper are based on a five-factor model. 
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factor comprises the bulk of the GSDB, both in terms of content and theoretical significance, so 
some researchers might exclude the minor factors (i.e., Gender Normativity, Uniformity, 
Surgery, and Upbringing) for parsimony. 
I tested a two-factor model (GSDB-2) as a theoretical alternative to the GSDB factor 
structure I had previously derived (Kline, 2015). my rationale for testing this model was to 
determine whether a more parsimonious structure might fit the GSDB. In the EFA in Study 1, the 
Affirmation factor explained a very large proportion of the variance and was strongly negatively 
correlated with trans-prejudice, whereas all other factors that significantly correlated with trans-
prejudice correlated positively (Table 3.3). Therefore, it is plausible that the scale might actually 
assess only two types of beliefs: those negatively associated with trans-prejudice (i.e., 
Affirmation) and those positively associated with trans-prejudice (i.e., Gender Normativity, 
Uniformity, and Surgery). Because the Upbringing factor did not correlate with the GTS-R, it 
was excluded from this model.  
Fit indices for all three models are listed in Table 3.4. I examined several measures of 
model fit (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003), including: the χ2  test, comparative fit index (CFI), 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and its 90% 
confidence interval, and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). I also examined the 
χ2/df ratio, because all chi-square tests were significant, which is common with large sample 
sizes (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003; but see Kline, 2015) 
The GSDB-Full model showed acceptable fit across indicators, χ2 (265) = 685.32, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 2.59, CFI = .92, TLI = .91, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .07. However, the item, 
“Transgender men can only truly be men if they look and behave in masculine ways,” on the 
Gender Normativity factor, had an unacceptably low factor loading (Saris et al., 2009). Also, 
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modification indices suggested multiple possible misspecifications in the model involving this 
item. Therefore, this item was deleted from the scale. To further improve fit, I allowed errors to 
correlate between a pair of items with a high modification index: “Non-binary identities are 
valid” and “Non-binary identities have always existed” (Affirmation). my final model fit the data 
well, χ2 (281) = 553.25, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.35, CFI = .94, TLI = .93, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .07 
(Figure 3.1).  
Similar to the GSDB-Full, GSDB-Affirm also fit the data well, χ2 (76) = 204.90, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 2.70, CFI = .96, TLI = .96, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .08. I allowed error terms to 
correlate between the same two items about non-binary identities as for GSDB-Full. Notably, 
some indices (CFI, TLI, SRMR) showed excellent fit of this model to the data, whereas the 
RMSEA indicated just acceptable fit (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003).  
Finally, the theoretical alternative model, GSDB-2, exhibited poor fit to the data across 
all fit indices, χ2 (187) =906.35, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.85, CFI = .85, TLI = .83, SRMR = .11, 
RMSEA = .11 (DeVellis, 2012). Modification indices suggested allowing error terms to correlate 
between the two Surgery items and each of the Uniformity items, which would ultimately 
restructure the model to resemble GSDB-Full. Therefore, I rejected GSDB-2 as an alternative 
model. 
Concurrent and Divergent Validity  
I examined correlations between GSDB factors and several theoretically related 
constructs using α = 0.05 to determine significance (Table 3.6). Affirmation exhibited significant 
and strong negative correlations with SDO (r = -.52), RWA (r = -.61), GES (r = -.65), and 
conservatism (r = -0.63). Gender Normativity significantly correlated positively with SDO (r = 
.45), RWA (r = .60), NFC (r = .14), GES (r = .65), and conservatism (r = .47). Uniformity also 
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significantly correlated positively with SDO (r = .25), RWA (r = .39), GES (r = .54), and 
conservatism (r =.29). Surgery had small, significant positive correlations with SDO (r = .21), 
RWA (r = .19), GES (r = .25), and conservatism (r = .19). Upbringing did not significantly 
correlate with any other constructs. 
Gender/Sex Group Attitudes  
I examined correlations between each of the GSDB factors and 11 gender/sex groups 
using α = .05 to determine significance (Table 3.5). All the same factors that significantly 
correlated with the GTS (Affirmation, Gender Normativity, Uniformity, and Surgery) correlated 
with feeling thermometers about gender/sex minorities, and correlations were in the same 
direction. Upbringing also remained uncorrelated with prejudice toward gender/sex minorities. 
Notably, GSDB factors displayed smaller correlations with attitudes toward gender/sex 
minorities than they did with the GTS in Study 1, as I expected. 
Affirmation was significantly and strongly associated with positive feelings toward 
gender/sex minorities (.60 > r’s > .70), suggesting that affirming beliefs about gender/sex 
diversity have a strong relationship with feelings toward gender/sex minorities but they are not 
entirely overlapping constructs. I observed a very high correlation (r = .80) between Gender 
Normativity and the GTS in Study 1, suggesting convergent validity of the Gender Normativity 
factor with the GTS (Table 3.3). However, Gender Normativity had a non-convergent, 
significant relationship to feeling thermometers in the present study (-.45 > r ‘s > -.55), 
suggesting it is a related but separable construct from feelings toward gender/sex minorities. 
In addition to prejudice toward transgender and non-binary individuals, I examined 
correlations between GSDB factors and feelings toward gender diverse women and men (with 
cisgender/transgender status unspecified). Affirmation was significantly positively correlated 
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with feelings toward feminine men (r = .46) and masculine women (r = .43). Gender 
Normativity was significantly negatively correlated with feelings toward masculine women (r = -
.45) and feminine men (r = -.50). Uniformity had a significant, weak negative relationship with 
feelings toward masculine women (r = -.22) and feminine men (r = -.23), as did Surgery 
(feminine men: r = -.17; masculine women: r = -.13). 
I also examined the relationship of GSDB factors with feelings toward gender/sex 
majorities (cisgender women and men), women and men in general, and feminine and masculine 
men and women (who might be gender/sex majorities or minorities, depending on factors that 
were not specified in my prompts including self-identification and status as cisgender or 
transgender, among others). Affirmation had small, significant positive correlations with feelings 
toward cisgender women (r = 0.16) and cisgender men (r = 0.13), and no other factor did. 
Gender Normativity had small, significant positive relationships with feelings toward men in 
general (r = 0.15), feminine women, (r = 0.16), and masculine men (r = 0.23). Uniformity had 
small, significant positive relationships with feelings toward men in general (r = 0.19), masculine 
men (r = 0.19), and feminine women (r = 0.15). 
Incremental Validity 
To determine the incremental validity of the GSDB for predicting attitudes about 
gender/sex minorities beyond related measures, I conducted hierarchal linear regression with the 
measures examined for concurrent validity (social dominance orientation, right-wing 
authoritarianism, need for closure, gender essentialism, and conservatism) entered at Step 1 and 
summed scores for each GSDB factor at Step 2 (Table 3.7). Feelings toward transgender women, 
transgender men, and non-binary individuals were all very highly correlated (.87 > r’s > .97), so 
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I used a summed average of the three variables as my outcome variable (i.e., feelings toward 
gender/sex minorities). 
At Step 1, the model was significant F(5, 289) = 37.83, p < .001, adjusted R2adj = .39. 
When the GSDB was added to the model, it remained significant and explained a significantly 
greater portion of the variance in feelings toward gender/sex minorities, F(10, 284) = 31.30, p < 
.001, R2adj = .52. Affirmation, β = .50,  p < .001, and Gender Normativity, β = .20, p = .001 
factors were both significant predictors. Notably, gender essentialism (Skewes et al., 2018) was a 
significant predictor at Step 1, but not at Step 2, supporting the conclusion that gender/sex 
diversity beliefs uniquely explain variance in feelings toward gender/sex minorities as compared 
to essentialist beliefs about differences between women and men. 
Study 2 Discussion 
 In this study, I found the factor structure of the GSDB remained stable with a new 
sample. And, I confirmed that the Affirmation factor exhibits good fit when modeled on its own. 
The GSDB exhibits concurrent validity with theoretically related constructs, including social 
dominance, right-wing authoritarianism, and conservatism. I also observed that most GSDB 
factors exhibited strong correlations with the gender essentialism scale from Skewes et al. 
(2018). However, these correlations were not so strong as to suggest that the GSDB and gender 
essentialism scale measure identical constructs; therefore, I interpret these results as evidence 
that the GSDB is not redundant with measures of gender/sex essentialism that focus on 
differences between (typically implicitly assumed) cisgender women and men.  
I also replicated my finding of links between GSDB factors and prejudice with a different 
measure that is able to disaggregate gender/sex groups (i.e., feeling thermometers). As I 
predicted, correlations between the GSDB and gender/sex minority feeling thermometers were 
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similar to correlations between the GSDB and genderism/transphobia, but generally lower – 
particularly for the Gender Normativity factor. This is likely because the Genderism and 
Transphobia Scale measures both cognitive and affective prejudice, and thus somewhat overlaps 
with the GSDB, whereas feeling thermometers are a purer measure of affective prejudice and do 
not overlap with the GSDB. Therefore, I conclude that the GSDB measures beliefs about 
gender/sex that are highly relevant to feelings toward gender/sex minorities, but separate. 
Further, I found evidence of the incremental validity of the GSDB, particularly the Affirmation 
and Gender Normativity factors, for predicting attitudes toward gender/sex minorities over a 
number of measures related to hierarchal and conservative sociopolitical beliefs. Future research 
on prejudice against transgender and/or non-binary people will benefit from incorporating the 
GSDB in addition to commonly studied sociopolitical ideology variables, such as social 
dominance orientation.  
Finally, I also examined links between GSDB factors and feelings toward gender/sex 
majorities and other gender/sex groups for exploratory purposes. The Affirmation factor 
positively correlated with feelings toward gender/sex majorities (i.e., cisgender women and 
cisgender men) and groups that might be labeled as either majorities or minorities depending on 
contextual factors (i.e., feminine men and masculine women), and did not correlate negatively 
with feelings toward any group. This suggests that affirmation of gender/sex diversity does not 
involve antipathy toward gender/sex majorities, at least in a gender/sex majority sample, and 
might actually be associated with more positive feelings toward gender/sex groups overall. 
Gender Normativity and Uniformity, which were both associated with prejudice toward 
gender/sex minorities, feminine men, and masculine women were also associated with positive 
feelings toward men, and masculine men in particular. Further research might investigate links 
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between Gender Normativity and Uniformity beliefs and other constructs; for example, an 
investigation of links to femmephobia (Hoskin, 2019) to better understand why these factors are 
simultaneously associated with warm feelings toward some groups of men (i.e., masculine men, 
men in general) and not others (i.e., transgender men, cisgender men, feminine men). 
Study 3: Test-Retest Reliability 
I calculated two-week and four-week test-retest reliability of the GSDB using two 
separate samples. I first examined two-week test-retest reliability with a sample of MTurk 
participants (Study 3a; N = 48). Sample size was determined based on recommendations from 
Walter, Eliasziw, & Donner (1998). More recent recommendations suggest larger samples to 
establish test-retest reliability (i.e., N > 100; Terwee et al., 2012); therefore, I also examined 
GSDB data collected at two time points four weeks apart from another sample (Study 3b; N = 
500; Schudson et al., 2020).   
Study 3a 
The two-week test-retest reliability of Affirmation was excellent, ICC = 0.97, 95% CI 
(0.94, 0.98). Gender Normativity, ICC = 0.83, 95% CI (0.71, 0.90) and Surgery, ICC = 0.89, 
95% CI (0.81, 0.93) exhibited good reliability. Uniformity ICC = 0.69, 95% CI (0.51, 0.81) and 
Upbringing, ICC = 0.60, 95% CI (0.38, 0.75) exhibited low, albeit potentially acceptable 
reliability. Biology & Gender exhibited unacceptably low reliability, ICC = 0.24, 95% CI (-0.05, 
0.48). For this reason, Biology & Gender was dropped from the GSDB and was not included in 
the study from which the four-week test-retest reliability data are drawn.  
Study 3b 
The four-week test-retest reliability of Affirmation remained excellent, ICC = 0.91, 95% 
CI (0.89, 0.92). Gender Normativity, ICC = 0.82, 95% CI (0.79, 0.85), and Surgery, ICC = 0.70, 
   74 
95% CI (0.65, 0.74), each continued to exhibit good or acceptable test-retest reliability. And test-
retest reliability for both Uniformity, ICC = 0.68, 95% CI (0.63, 0.73), and Upbringing ICC = 
0.56, 95% CI (0.49, 0.61), remained questionable. 
Overall, results from Study 3 suggests that participants’ responses to the Affirmation 
factor displayed excellent consistency over time. The retained minor factors of the GSDB range 
from somewhat to very consistent over time. 
General Discussion 
 In the present research, I constructed the Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale (GSDB), a 
scale measuring essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex diversity. The 
final GSDB consists of five factors: Affirmation, Gender Normativity, Uniformity, Surgery, and 
Upbringing and exhibits strong psychometric properties, including good model fit and test-retest 
reliability ranging from acceptable to excellent. All GSDB factors except Upbringing were 
associated with feelings toward gender/sex minorities that were either negative (Gender 
Normativity, Uniformity, Surgery) or positive (Affirmation). My findings show that the GSDB 
measures essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex that are distinct from, 
although linked to, other constructs including affective trans-prejudice and essentialist beliefs 
about differences between women and men. And, the GSDB demonstrated concurrent validity 
with other measures of sociopolitical ideology.  
 My research clarifies the latent structure of beliefs about the nature of gender/sex, 
including essentialist and social constructionist beliefs. I tested items relevant to a broad range of 
dimensions of essentialism identified in previous literature and novel dimensions uniquely 
relevant to gender/sex diversity (Bettcher, 2007; Haslam et al., 2000; van Anders et al., 2014). 
Essentialist attitudes about social categories have often factored into naturalness and entitativity 
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dimensions in prior research, with variation across studies and target social categories (Haslam et 
al., 2000). The GSDB, on the other hand, is composed of one large factor (Affirmation) that 
includes most dimensions of essentialism except a few entitativity-related aspects (i.e., 
uniformity, informativeness, and inherence), and several other smaller factors that measure 
specific kinds of prejudice-linked or neutral beliefs. The Affirmation factor included items that 
are particularly relevant to contemporary discourse on gender/sex diversity (i.e., the beliefs that 
were most identifiably trans-affirming or anti-trans). Other factors measured beliefs about 
gender/sex diversity that are important but less rhetorically central to public debates over trans 
rights (e.g., Uniformity). Therefore, it is likely that people’s essentialist and social 
constructionist beliefs about gender/sex diversity are currently primarily structured around their 
imagined relationship to affirmation or denial of the existence of gender/sex diversity. 
 I found that gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs were mostly social constructionist, 
although some were essentialist. In particular, a few essentialist items that focused on the 
naturalness and cultural/historical universality of gender/sex minority identities loaded positively 
on the Affirmation factor (e.g., “Non-binary gender identities have always existed”). This finding 
mirrors previous research on essentialism of sexual minority identities in which beliefs about the 
naturalness and universality of minority sexual orientations are associated with positive attitudes 
toward sexual minorities (Haslam & Levy, 2006). A notable distinguishing feature of these 
affirmation-linked essentialist beliefs is that they essentialize minority identities themselves (i.e., 
minority identities have an underlying reality) rather than the social category (i.e., gender/sex or 
sexual orientation themselves have an underlying reality that is incompatible with minority self-
understandings and experiences). Whether essentialist beliefs are politically valuable for 
gender/sex minorities, regardless of associations with positive attitudes, is an interesting site for 
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future research. Research on essentialism and sexual minority identities has found negative 
consequences of essentialist, “born this way” explanations of sexual minority identity at legal 
and structural levels, albeit some evidence of positive effects for individual mental health 
(Diamond & Rosky, 2016; Morandini et al., 2015). Further evidence is needed to understand the 
implications of essentialist, affirmation-linked beliefs about gender/sex diversity for gender/sex 
minorities. 
 One notable limitation of my research is that it indexes a current set of beliefs about 
gender/sex diversity that resonate with a predominantly white, formally educated, U.S.-based 
sample at the time of data collection (i.e., late 2018 - early 2019). Which kinds of beliefs about 
gender/sex diversity are prevalent – and how they link to prejudice and other attitudes – might be 
different depending on sample characteristics and might change across time and place (though 
this could be argued of any measure that is tied to sociopolitical attitudes). Still, the GSDB will 
need to be validated in different contexts and potentially modified or updated for use at different 
points in time or with different populations.  
 Future research might also examine the predictive validity of the GSDB for outcomes 
relevant to sociopolitical recognition of gender/sex minority identities and experiences. Some 
potentially fruitful questions include: Which GSDB factors, if any, predict support or opposition 
to trans-inclusive policies about access to gendered social spaces or athletics? Or, does the 
Surgery factor predict support restrictive policies about obtaining a new birth certificate or ID 
with an updated gender marker, which often require individuals to have undergone genital 
surgery (van Anders et al., 2014)?  
 Additionally, a strength of the GSDB for future research is its adaptability. The full 
GSDB exhibits mostly strong psychometric properties, although test-retest reliability for a few of 
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the minor factors (i.e., Uniformity and Upbringing) is questionable. The Affirmation subscale 
exhibits very strong psychometric properties and includes items representative of most 
dimensions of essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about social categories. The 
Affirmation subscale is also a strong predictor of feelings toward gender/sex minorities, with 
evidence of incremental validity compared to gender essentialism, social dominance orientation, 
and other variables relevant to gender/sex attitudes. Therefore, the Affirmation subscale could be 
effectively used in future research on its own. The Affirmation subscale allows researchers to 
study beliefs about gender/sex diversity without exposing participants to highly stigmatizing 
content found in previous scales (e.g., Hill & Willoughby, 2005) that might lead to 
disengagement among gender/sex minority participants and their close others. Gender/sex 
diversity affirmation might have significant implications for outcomes such as self-perception, 
internalized stigma, and identity centrality, among others.  
Conclusion 
 My research demonstrates that the GSDB is a reliable, valid measure of essentialist and 
social constructionist beliefs about gender/sex diversity. The Affirmation factor, comprised 
mostly of social constructionist beliefs, is strongly linked with positive feelings toward 
gender/sex minorities; the essentialist Gender Normativity, Uniformity, and Surgery factors are 
associated with negative feelings toward gender/sex minorities. This research advances our 
understanding of the cognitive basis of prejudice against gender/sex minorities and opens up new 
lines of inquiry into methods of fostering gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs and reducing 
prejudice-linked beliefs. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Sexual Configurations Theory as an Intervention to Improve Attitudes Toward 
Gender/Sex Minorities 
In Chapter 4, I described the development of the Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale 
(GSDB), a survey measure of essentialist and social constructionist beliefs about the nature of 
gender/sex, and I empirically demonstrated its relevance to understanding attitudes about 
transgender and non-binary people. In Chapter 5, I will describe an experimental test of an 
intervention to help gender/sex majorities cultivate affirming gender/sex diversity beliefs and 
positive attitudes toward gender/sex minorities. This intervention involved prompting cisgender 
participants to map their own gender/sexes via sexual configurations theory (SCT; van Anders, 
2015). I will describe the implications of this research for intergroup contact theory, the role of 
self-knowledge in intergroup attitudes, and efforts to advance the sociopolitical equality of 
gender/sex minority individuals.  
Sexual Configurations Theory 
SCT is a recently introduced theoretical framework for describing and studying 
gender/sex and sexual diversity (van Anders, 2015). Among other aspects, SCT allows for 
disaggregating gender (i.e., sociocultural aspects linked to femininity, masculinity, and gender 
diversity), sex (i.e., biological aspects linked to femaleness, maleness, and sex diversity), and 
gender/sex (i.e., whole identities linked to gender and/or sex such as woman, man, genderqueer, 
agender, etc.) in individuals’ own senses of self in addition to their partnered sexualities. SCT is 
modeled on three-dimensional diagrams that allow individuals to self-locate their gender/sexes 
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and partnered sexualities with attention to binary, nonbinary, and norm challenging aspects of a 
given sexual or gender/sex parameter, in addition to denoting the importance of that parameter, 
including whether it is important at all (Appendix C). 
Recent empirical work with SCT has demonstrated that it can be efficacious for 
educating sexual and gender/sex minority individuals about sexual and gender/sex diversity as 
well as majority individuals (Abed et al., 2019; Beischel et al., 2020; Schudson et al., 2017). In 
these studies, participants located themselves on a series of SCT diagrams delineating individual 
gender/sex and/or partnered sexualities. By considering the specificity of their own location on 
each diagram relative to the full range of possible locations, participants reported understanding 
better how their sexualities and gender/sexes are situated within the diverse array of gender/sexes 
and partnered sexualities that people actually have. Notably, some sexual and gender/sex 
majority individuals have also reported that engaging with SCT caused them to reflect on their 
own experiences of social privilege (Abed et al., 2019). Abed et al. suggested that SCT might be 
particularly valuable as an intervention into prejudice against gender/sex and sexual minorities 
through incorporation into diversity workshops or other prejudice reduction efforts. But this 
remains to be seen.  
SCT might be particularly effective at promoting affirming beliefs about gender/sex 
diversity because it is based in the lived experiences of gender/sex minority individuals. For 
instance, SCT allows for visualization of nonbinary gender/sex, temporality, and the theoretical 
independence of each facet of gender/sex, among others. These insights from gender/sex 
minorities’ lived experiences contrast with many (although not all) essentialist ideas about 
gender/sex that are linked to prejudice against gender/sex minorities, as demonstrated in Chapter 
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4. SCT therefore provides a means of understanding gender/sex in ways that directly contrast the 
hegemonic understandings of gender/sex that underlie prejudice.  
Reducing Prejudice Toward Gender/Sex Minorities 
Prejudice reduction interventions aimed at anti-transgender prejudice have taken multiple 
forms in prior research, including education-based and humanizing interventions. Education-
based interventions in previous studies have mostly been operationalized in highly didactic forms 
that focus on providing clinical information (e.g., describing gender dysphoria, mental health 
disparities, etc.). Typically, education-based interventions have shown inconsistent efficacy for 
reducing anti-transgender prejudice (Case & Stewart, 2013; Galinec & Korajlija, 2017; Mizock 
et al., 2017; Tompkins et al., 2015; Walch, Sinkkanen, et al., 2012). Humanizing interventions 
focus on individuals’ affective connections to gender/sex minorities and anti-transgender 
prejudice. Often, humanizing interventions are based in intergroup contact theory, which 
stipulates that contact improves intergroup relations under particular, cooperative conditions 
(Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). These interventions typically use actual or simulated contact 
with gender/sex minorities via the sharing of personal narratives (Case & Stewart, 2013; Galinec 
& Korajlija, 2017; McDermott et al., 2018; Tompkins et al., 2015; Walch, Sinkkanen, et al., 
2012). Some studies also incorporate perspective-taking to encourage gender/sex majorities to 
consider minority viewpoints and experiences (Broockman & Kalla, 2016; Tompkins et al., 
2015).  
In general, humanizing and intergroup contact-based interventions have been more 
consistently effective than education-based interventions. Across social categories, evidence 
suggests that intergroup contact is one of the most effective methods of prejudice reduction 
(Paluck & Green, 2009; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005b). 
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In the context of gender/sex minority prejudice reduction, correlational studies indicate that 
contact with transgender individuals is negatively linked to anti-transgender prejudice. These 
studies have found that cisgender people with some degree of contact with transgender people 
have less prejudiced attitudes than those with no contact (Barbir et al., 2017; Hoffarth & Hodson, 
2018; King et al., 2009; Tadlock et al., 2017; Wang-Jones et al., 2017; Willoughby et al., 2010). 
These findings of the relative efficacy of intergroup contact compared to education-based 
interventions raises the question of whether there is value in continuing to investigate education-
based interventions at all. But, one important reason for the discrepancy in efficacy between 
contact-based and education-based interventions is how education has been operationalized. The 
interventions used in prior research might have failed to challenge and/or actually strengthened 
biologically essentialist, prejudice-linked beliefs about gender/sex by framing gender/sex 
identities as a niche, clinical issue (Tompkins et al., 2015; Walch, Sinkkanen, et al., 2012). In 
contrast, Case and Stewart (2013) utilized a relatively didactic intervention but, instead of 
focusing on clinical aspects, their intervention challenged myths about transgender identity, 
many of which were essentialist beliefs based in the natural attitude about gender (Bettcher, 
2007; Garfinkel, 1967; Kessler & McKenna, 2000). They found that this approach was equally 
successful in reducing anti-transgender prejudice compared to two other interventions that 
exposed participants to transgender individuals’ personal narratives. Therefore, I contend that 
education-based interventions could be equally effective as more affectively focused, 
humanizing interventions if they focused on exploring gender/sex diversity and fostering 
affirming beliefs, rather than presenting clinical and potentially medicalizing information about 
gender dysphoria. 
Changing Prejudice Through Self-Knowledge 
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At present, the efficacy of dynamic, diversity-focused, education-based interventions has 
received little empirical attention. SCT might be an especially valuable framework because it 
centers gender/sex diversity in its construction – both its construction as a theory and in the 
structure of its diagrams. Further, SCT encourages individuals to deeply consider their own 
gender/sex identities and locate their identities among diverse possibilities. Seeing one’s majority 
identity situated among diverse minority identities might help engender depathologizing views of 
gender/sex diversity by emphasizing the situated nature of all gender/sex locations – even 
majority ones. SCT is a unique education-based intervention in this respect: it educates 
participants about gender/sex diversity but also functions as a framework for self-knowledge.  
Why might having cisgender people engage in an activity that facilitates knowing one’s 
own gender/sex more deeply (i.e., SCT) affect their attitudes about other groups? First, self-
concepts and perceptions of others are deeply intertwined (Crocker et al., 1987; Ehrlich, 1973). 
For instance, self-esteem in particular shapes people’s motivations to endorse prejudice and 
affects the contexts in which prejudice can be mitigated (Crocker et al., 1987; Galinsky & Ku, 
2004). For instance, prejudice can serve self-protective functions when people’s self-concepts 
are threatened (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Outgroup derogation is a method of individual and 
collective self-esteem enhancement for ingroup members, because it strengthens distinctions 
between groups and concretizes hierarchy (Crocker et al., 1987). Diversity frameworks like SCT 
ask individuals to visualize their identities in a way that lacks clear intergroup boundaries at all. 
Therefore, it is possible that an SCT intervention might weaken distinctions between gender/sex 
groups and mitigate individuals’ need for self-enhancement via prejudice. Although notably, 
there is a possibility that the lack of intergroup boundaries on an SCT diagram might induce a 
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status threat to gender/sex majorities, which could cause a backlash effect (i.e., greater 
prejudice). 
At a broad level, SCT makes gender/sex diversity self-relevant for gender/sex majorities, 
who might otherwise view gender/sex diversity as completely disconnected from their own 
experience. Specifically, SCT allows individuals to directly visualize their own location within 
gender/sex diversity. Participants can indicate binary gender/sex identification with SCT (i.e., 
they do not have to indicate that they personally hold non-binary or non-normative 
identifications or experiences), but their marks are always positioned relative to all other 
gender/sexes. This relative positioning might increase majorities’ perceptions of self-other 
overlap with gender/sex minorities (Galinsky et al., 2005). Further, people cognitively process 
self-relevant information preferentially to other kinds of information (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; 
Rogers et al., 1977). Therefore, the self-relevance effect of the SCT intervention might increase 
participants’ uptake of SCT’s gender/sex diversity framework. 
Because SCT is rooted in self-knowledge, it can be completed by gender/sex majorities 
on their own. Some prior interventions have required gender/sex minorities to actively 
participate in interventions by telling their own stories of gender/sex transition to study 
participants (e.g., Walch et al., 2012). Overreliance on interventions that require gender/sex 
minorities to tell emotionally vulnerable personal narratives to majority audiences risks placing 
an excessive burden on minority individuals to end majorities’ prejudice against them (White 
Hughto et al., 2015). These contact-based interventions in which gender/sex minorities tell 
personal narratives have shown efficacy in reducing prejudice (Walch, Sinkkanen, et al., 2012), 
and personal narrative remains an important tool for combatting prejudice. However, it is 
important to develop effective interventions that do not require gender/sex minority individuals 
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to perform the emotionally demanding labor of changing gender/sex majorities’ hearts and 
minds. A broader range of effective interventions can help prevent the entire burden of ending 
prejudice against gender/sex minorities from falling on individual gender/sex minorities. And, in 
this respect, SCT holds significant promise. 
Finally, it is important to consider the possibility that gender/sex majorities might not 
benefit from a gender/sex diversity framework like SCT because they view their own 
gender/sexes as simple. However, evidence suggests that many gender/sex majorities have 
feelings and identifications that branch from their gender/sex identity (Abed et al., 2019; Joel et 
al., 2014). Further, the context of SCT might especially encourage diverse identifications. The 
identity-based motivation framework (Oyserman, 2009; Oyserman et al., 2017) suggests that 
identities are dynamically constructed in context, rather than static entities that precede and 
determine social interactions and decision-making. The context of a broad, three-dimensional, 
visual space to locate one’s own gender/sex might cue individuals to frame their identities in 
context-specific ways. People who typically would describe their own gender/sex solely as 
“woman” or “man” might consider a range of other elements in the context of an SCT gender/sex 
diagram (e.g., femininity, masculinity, relation to social norms, gender/sex strength, and bodily 
variation, among others) and self-locate in ways that incorporate those elements in different 
ways. Therefore, SCT might involve a process of self-discovery that facilitates self-description in 
nuanced ways.  
Durable Prejudice Reduction 
Can SCT have a lasting effect on attitudes about gender/sex minorities? Some evidence 
suggests that prejudice reduction effects can be durable across time under specific circumstances 
– in particular, when the intervention requires effortful cognitive processing and active, empathic 
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consideration of minority individuals’ perspectives (Broockman & Kalla, 2016; Vezzali et al., 
2012). SCT is highly effortful to engage with and stimulates majorities to consider minority 
individuals’ viewpoints and experiences (Abed et al., 2019; Schudson et al., 2017). But, there 
remain many open questions about what makes a prejudice reduction intervention effective in the 
long-term or the short-term only. This knowledge gap is exacerbated by the fact that researchers 
do not often measure longitudinal outcomes of prejudice reduction interventions, especially 
brief, experimental interventions (Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Paluck & Green, 2009). 
Examining longitudinal durability of prejudice reduction interventions is particularly 
necessary to understand the mechanisms through which prejudice reduction successfully occurs 
and persists. Prejudice is commonly understood as having deep roots in childhood upbringing 
and therefore highly resistant to change (Allport, 1954; Bigler & Liben, 2007). Also, prejudicial 
attitudes are often undergirded by beliefs about social categories that naturalize systems of power 
and domination that benefit majority groups (Keller, 2005; Mahalingam, 2007). Therefore, it is 
remarkable that some interventions have successfully reduced prejudice at all despite its deep 
roots and interconnections with broader beliefs about social categories. SCT might be well-
positioned to have a longitudinal impact because it focuses on broadening the beliefs about 
gender/sex as a social category that underlie prejudice toward gender/sex minorities. Changes in 
beliefs about social categories might have implications extending far beyond a single laboratory 
session. 
The Present Research 
In this study, I investigated whether an SCT intervention can reduce gender/sex 
majorities’ prejudice toward gender/sex minorities. I pre-registered the study’s hypotheses, 
methods, and analysis plan with AsPredicted.org (#26145). Pre-registration is an emerging 
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practice in social psychology, and experimental sciences more broadly, that facilitates 
transparency in reporting the a priori assumptions, predictions, and plans guiding research (van 
’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). I hypothesized that participating in a sexual configurations 
theory (SCT) based prejudice reduction intervention will increase positive feelings toward 
transgender and non-binary individuals in cisgender individuals. Further, I hypothesized that the 
prejudice reduction effect would be stronger for participants who map their own gender/sexes via 
SCT, compared to those who learn about SCT but do not use the diagrams, which would in turn 
be more effective than a neutral condition. Finally, I predicted that these effects would be evident 
at baseline and at follow-up four weeks later.5 
Methods 
Participants 
I recruited participants (N = 600) to participate in a research study on their beliefs about 
gender using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) via CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017). 
MTurk is well suited to collecting reliable, longitudinal, experimental data (Buhrmester et al., 
2016; Stoycheff, 2016). Sample size was determined via Monte Carlo power analysis for 
mediation models (Schoemann et al., 2017), based on an expected retention rate of two-thirds of 
 
5 I also hypothesized that gender/sex diversity beliefs would mediate the relationship between 
experimental condition and feelings toward gender/sex minorities at follow-up. However, I later 
determined I could not properly examine mediation because there was no true pre-test measure 
of gender/sex diversity beliefs (i.e., I did not have data on change over time). I will examine 
gender/sex diversity beliefs as a mediator in a follow-up study. 
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participants from Time 1 to Time 2, as observed in other longitudinal studies that used MTurk 
for recruitment (Daly & Nataraajan, 2015; Stoycheff, 2016)  
Study participants ranged in age from 18 to 76 (M = 40.33, SD = 12.17). They indicated 
their racial/ethnic, gender/sex, and sexual identities via free response, and I coded them into 
categories. See Table 4.1 for demographic information. 
Measures  
Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale (GSDB; (Schudson & van Anders, 2020)  
The GSDB is a 23-item scale that measures essentialist and social constructionist beliefs 
about gender/sex pertinent to gender/sex minority identities (see Chapter 4; see Appendix B). I 
used summed scores on the Affirmation subscale (14 items; α = .96), which comprises the bulk 
of the GSDB and is the subscale most relevant to attitudes toward gender/sex minorities. 
Feelings Thermometers 
Feelings thermometers measure the valence of individuals’ feelings toward particular 
groups from 0, coldest or least favorable, to 100, warmest or most favorable (see Chapter 4). I 
measured feelings toward the following gender/sex groups: transgender women, transgender 
men, non-binary individuals, feminine men, masculine men, feminine women, masculine 
women, cisgender women, cisgender men, men in general, and women in general. Feelings 
toward transgender women, transgender men, and non-binary people were all highly correlated 
with one another (r’s > .9), so they were averaged to produce a composite score of feelings 
toward gender/sex minorities. 
Modified Differential Emotions Scale (mDES; Fredrickson et al., 2003) 
The mDES is a 20-item scale assessing positive and negative emotions. Participants rated 
how strongly they felt each of the emotions during the video and activity on a scale from 1 (not 
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at all) to 5 (extremely). I added an additional item, “connected to others different from me,” to 
assess whether feelings of connectedness might play a role in the impact of the intervention.  
Intergroup Contact with Gender/Sex Minorities   
Three separate items assessed whether participants have a family member, friend, or 
acquaintance who is transgender and/or nonbinary. Contact with gender/sex minority individuals 
is associated with lower prejudice (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2018; King et al., 2009; Tadlock et al., 
2017; Wang-Jones et al., 2017). In analyses, I grouped participants by those with any intergroup 
contact (i.e., responded “yes” to at least one of the three items; n = 252) and those with no 
intergroup contact (n = 321). 
Procedure 
Baseline  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the Diagrams 
condition, participants watched a 12-minute video providing information on gender, sex, and 
gender/sex and explaining how to map these dimensions on SCT diagrams, and then mapped 
their own gender/sexes on three, separate SCT diagrams (gender, sex, and gender/sex) using a 
digital drawing interface (Beischel et al., 2020). In the Video Only condition, participants 
watched the same video explaining SCT, but did not complete SCT diagrams themselves. 
Instead, they spent at least 5 minutes completing a word search with a neutral theme for hidden 
words (i.e., fruits and vegetables). This allowed the Video Only condition to control for the 
impact of self-locating one’s gender/sex with SCT diagrams separately from learning about SCT 
and gender/sex more broadly through the instructional video. In the Neutral condition, 
participants watched a 12-minute neutral travel video that has been shown in prior research to 
have minimal impact on self-reported affect and arousal (Goldey & van Anders, 2011), and then 
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completed the same neutral word search as in the Video Only condition. The Neutral condition 
controlled for engaging with SCT at all, whether via instructional video and/or self-location on 
the diagrams. Finally, participants provided demographic information and completed all survey 
measures. 
Follow-up  
Participants were re-contacted four weeks later to notify them of their eligibility to 
complete the second part of the study. Retention was high (N = 518; 86.3% of the original 
sample). Participants completed a brief online survey consisting only of feeling thermometers 
and the GSDB.  
Analysis 
I used IBM SPSS 26.0 for data analysis. In all analyses, I excluded participants who 
straight-lined responses to scale measures (n = 9). I also excluded gender/sex minority 
participants (n = 18) because of my specific interest in assessing the impact of the intervention 
on cisgender individuals.  
Statistical analyses varied from those that I pre-registered. Pre-registered analyses were 
suited to assessing change over time in attitudes; however, I ultimately designed the study such 
that I did not have measures of feelings toward gender/sex minorities or beliefs about gender/sex 
diversity prior to administration of the intervention. Therefore, I instead used analyses suited to 
assessing the impact of the intervention at baseline and the stability of effects at follow-up (i.e., 
univariate ANOVA).  
Results 
Prejudice Reduction at Baseline 
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I examined the effect of experimental condition on feelings toward gender/sex minorities 
and gender/sex diversity affirmation beliefs. Feelings toward gender/sex minorities did not 
significantly differ across the three conditions based on the omnibus test, F(2, 570) = 2.71, p = 
.068 η2p = 0.009 (Figure 4.1). Because the omnibus test was less theoretically meaningful than 
pairwise comparisons between the Diagrams condition and each of the other two conditions, and 
its marginal p-value raised the possibility that pairwise comparisons might reveal important 
patterns in the data, I proceeded to examine post-hoc tests. Post-hoc LSD tests suggested that 
participants in the Diagrams condition had more positive feelings toward gender/sex minorities 
than those in the Neutral condition, p =.022, but not in the Video Only condition, p = .12. The 
Video Only and Neutral conditions did not significantly differ, p = .43. Gender/sex diversity 
affirmation beliefs did not significantly differ across the three conditions based on the omnibus 
test, F(2, 570) = 2.14, p = .12, η2p = 0.007 (Figure 4.2). Post-hoc LSD tests suggested that 
participants in the Diagrams condition had more positive feelings toward gender/sex minorities 
than those in the Video Only condition, p =.040, but not in the Neutral condition, p = .20. Again, 
the Video Only and Neutral conditions did not significantly differ, p = .43. 
Moderating Role of Intergroup Contact  
I conducted pre-registered analyses exploring the role of intergroup contact as a 
moderator of the effect. I conducted a factorial 3x2 ANOVA with experimental condition and 
intergroup contact (i.e., any or none) as independent variables and feelings toward gender/sex 
minorities as the outcome. The model was statistically significant, F(5, 567) = 13.99, p < .001, 
η2p = 0.11. Intergroup contact had a significant, large effect on feelings toward gender/sex 
minorities, F(1, 567) = 63.48, p < .001, η2p = 0.10. The effect of experimental condition on 
feelings was non-significant, F(2, 567) = 2.78, p = .063, η2p = 0.01, as was the interaction of 
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intergroup contact and experimental condition, F(2, 567) = .82, p = .44, η2p = 0.003. I examined 
simple effects to determine if the Diagrams condition differed significantly from the other 
conditions based on intergroup contact. Among participants with some level of contact with 
gender/sex minorities, those in the Diagrams condition had significantly more positive feelings 
than those in the Video Only condition, p = .025, but not in the Neutral condition, p = .063. 
Among those who had no contact with gender/sex minorities, the Diagrams condition did not 
differ from Video Only, p = .32, or Neutral, p = .78. 
I then conducted the same factorial 3x2 ANOVA (experimental condition and intergroup 
contact (i.e., any or none) as independent variables) but with affirming gender/sex diversity 
beliefs as the outcome. The model was also statistically significant, F(5, 567) = 17.16, p < .001, 
η2p = 0.13. Intergroup contact had a significant, large effect on affirming gender/sex diversity 
beliefs, F(1, 567) = 81.98, p < .001, η2p = 0.12. The effect of experimental condition was non-
significant, F(2, 567) = 2.08, p = .13, η2p = 0.007, as was the interaction of intergroup contact and 
experimental condition, F(2, 567) = .13, p = .88, η2p = .001. I examined simple effects to 
determine if the Diagrams condition differed significantly from the other conditions based on 
intergroup contact. Gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs were not significantly higher in the 
Diagrams condition than the other conditions for participants with intergroup contact (Video 
Only, p = .45, Neutral, p = .10) or for those without (Video Only, p =.37, Neutral, p = .24). 
Prejudice Reduction at Follow-up 
I analyzed whether the prejudice reduction effects observed at baseline among 
participants with intergroup contact with gender/sex minorities were evident at follow-up four 
weeks later, but they were not. There were no significant differences between conditions at 
follow-up in feelings toward gender/sex minorities, F(2, 476) = 1.47, p = .23, η2p = 0.006, or in 
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gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs, F(2, 475) = .78, p = .46, η2p = 0.003. Effects remained 
nonsignificant when I explored intergroup contact as a moderator. 
Exploratory Analyses of Emotions 
I conducted pre-registered analyses exploring the impact of the SCT intervention on 
emotions. First, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the modified differential emotions 
scale (mDES) to examine its structure in the context of the present experiment. I used maximum 
likelihood extraction and a promax rotation. The factor analysis yielded 3 factors. First was 
positive emotions with an eigenvalue of 7.38, which explained 35.12% of the variance. Another 
factor consisted of negative emotions, with an eigenvalue of 4.37, which explained 20.79% of 
the variance. And finally, the factor analysis yielded a factor with items related to shame, with an 
eigenvalue of 1.44, which explained 6.84% of the variance. I retained all factors for further 
analysis, and I calculated factor scores by summing items. 
I analyzed the relationship between experimental condition, intergroup contact, and 
emotions via three separate 3x2 ANOVAs, using factor scores for each of the three factors. The 
overall model for positive emotions was not significant, F(5, 567) = 1.84, p = .10, η2p = .02, 
although intergroup contact had a significant effect on positive emotions, such that participants 
who had contact with gender/sex minorities experienced more positive emotions than those who 
did not, F(1, 567) = 5.24, p = .022, η2p = .009.  
The overall model was significant for negative emotions, F(5, 567) = 6.71, p < .001, η2p = 
0.056. Both experimental condition, F(2,567) = 8.19, p < .001, η2p = .03, and intergroup contact, 
F(1, 567) = 13.17, p < .001, η2p = .02, had significant effects on negative emotions. I examined 
simple effects, which indicated that, among participants who had no intergroup contact with 
gender/sex minorities, those in the Video Only condition reported more negative emotions than 
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those in the Diagrams condition, p = .021, or the Neutral condition, p < .001. Finally, the model 
predicting shame-related emotions was not significant, F(5, 567) = 1.17, p = .32, η2p = 0.01. 
However, participants who reported no intergroup contact with gender/sex minorities had higher 
shame-related emotions, F(1, 567) = 3.97, p = .047, η2p = .007.  
Discussion 
In Chapter 5, I experimentally tested the efficacy of SCT as an intervention to increase 
gender/sex majorities’ gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs and positive feelings toward 
gender/sex minorities. In this intervention, gender/sex majorities mapped their own gender/sexes 
via SCT diagrams. I also tested two control conditions: one in which SCT was explained via 
video but participants did not have a chance to map their own gender/sexes, and a neutral 
control. I found partial support for my hypothesis: The Diagrams condition significantly 
improved participants’ feelings toward gender/sex minorities relative to the Video Only 
condition, though not the Neutral condition, and improved participants’ gender/sex diversity 
affirming beliefs relative to the Neutral condition, but not the Video Only condition. Taken 
together, I interpret these findings as strong though preliminary evidence for the potential of SCT 
to be used as a potentially effective prejudice reduction intervention.  
I also hypothesized that the impact of the intervention on attitudes about gender/sex 
minorities would be durable over time, but I did not find support for this part of my hypothesis. 
The effect of the Diagrams condition on feelings toward gender/sex minorities and gender/sex 
diversity affirming beliefs was not evident at follow-up four weeks later. It is possible that SCT 
does not have long-term efficacy when used as a brief, single-session intervention. Alternatively, 
the SCT intervention itself might be altered to increase the long-term impact of the single-
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session. Future research should explore both of these possibilities to better understand the 
timescale and determinants of the extinction process for the effect of the intervention. 
I found that intergroup contact had a large main effect on both feelings toward gender/sex 
minorities and gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs. This finding accords with other studies that 
have found intergroup contact is a strong, negative predictor of implicit and explicit attitudes 
toward gender/sex minorities (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2018; King et al., 2009; Tadlock et al., 2017; 
Wang-Jones et al., 2017). The present research adds that intergroup contact with gender/sex 
minorities is strongly linked to people’s beliefs about gender/sex diversity more broadly (i.e, 
social constructionist and essentialist beliefs about the nature of gender/sex). One potential 
explanation for this relationship between intergroup contact and beliefs about gender/sex 
diversity is that knowing a gender/sex minority is a form of firsthand knowledge that a 
cisnormative, binary framing of gender/sex does not accommodate actual gender/sex diversity 
embodied by real people. Also, the opposite causal relationship might exist: A gender/sex 
majority person might not know any gender/sex minority individuals because they endorse 
beliefs about the invalidity of gender/sex diverse identities, and therefore it could be unsafe for a 
gender/sex minority person in their life to disclose their identity. Put simply, gender/sex 
majorities who reported no intergroup contact in the study might actually know a gender/sex 
minority person; they just might not know that they do. 
I explored the role of intergroup contact in SCT’s efficacy as an intervention. Simple 
effects showed that that the impact of the SCT intervention on feeling thermometers varied 
depending on intergroup contact, such that only individuals who had a gender/sex minority 
friend, family member, and/or acquaintance showed significantly warmer feelings toward 
gender/sex minorities compared to those in the Video Only control (the same pattern was evident 
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for Neutral control, although non-significant). Therefore, the efficacy of the intervention might 
depend somewhat on whether individuals actually know a gender/sex minority person. Although 
the video explaining SCT shows a number of example characters, including several gender/sex 
minority characters, people who do not personally know any gender/sex minorities might still 
have difficulty conceptualizing what gender/sex diversity looks like. Further, the example 
characters in the videos are cartoons, so it is unclear whether participants experience the video as 
a form of simulated intergroup contact, as they might with real people as examples.  
My results provide some insight into the affective experiences of participants completing 
the intervention. In particular, participants’ negative and shame-related emotions varied based on 
experimental condition and intergroup contact. Overall, participants with no intergroup contact 
had higher negative and shame-related emotions compared to those who had intergroup contact. 
For negative emotions specifically, this effect was driven by higher negative emotions among 
participants without intergroup contact in the Video Only condition, compared to those without 
intergroup contact in the Diagrams or Neutral conditions. It is possible that simply viewing a 
video explaining SCT might induce some level of backlash among some gender/sex majorities 
without intergroup contact, but that actually having the chance to complete SCT diagrams 
afterward mitigates this effect. Importantly, gender/sex majorities can successfully locate their 
gender/sexes using SCT regardless of their attitudes about gender/sex minorities. But, gender/sex 
majorities who did not have the chance to use SCT might perceive SCT as exclusionary, because 
most of the surface area of the diagram represents minority gender/sexes (Appendix C). I 
interpret these results as indicating the necessity of SCT diagrams in the SCT intervention. It is 
not sufficient to merely educate participants about gender/sex diversity via SCT; they have to 
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locate their own gender/sexes within SCT to understand and/or internalize its model of 
gender/sex. 
The present study has some important limitations. First, although I based the sample size 
on a power analysis, I did not have strong prior information off which to base the estimated 
effect size, so the study is somewhat underpowered relative to the actual effect size of the 
intervention. A replication with a larger sample size would help determine if the effects observed 
in the present study are replicable and stable across outcome measures. Second, I originally 
hypothesized that gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs would mediate the prejudice reduction 
effect of the intervention. However, because I did not have a pre-test measure of gender/sex 
diversity affirming beliefs, I was not able to test this possibility. In follow-up work, I will assess 
gender/sex diversity beliefs prior to the intervention and analyze changes from pre- to post- as a 
mediator. Finally, the SCT intervention in this study was administered once in a single online, 
experimental session. It is possible that the SCT intervention might have a greater impact when 
administered longitudinally and/or in-person.  
Conclusion  
I found evidence supporting the efficacy of SCT as an intervention to improve gender/sex 
majorities beliefs about gender/sex diversity and attitudes toward gender/sex minorities. SCT is 
capable of affecting gender/sex majorities’ self-knowledge, which has implications for their 
knowledge about and feelings toward others. Efforts to promote equity for gender/sex minorities 
might benefit from addressing gender/sex majorities self-concepts in tandem with extant 
strategies (e.g., direct and indirect forms of intergroup contact and education), and SCT might be 
an effective means of doing so. 
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CHAPTER 6 
General Discussion 
In this dissertation, I characterized gender/sex diversity beliefs, determined their 
significance for understanding prejudice against gender/sex minorities, and developed an 
intervention that increased gender/sex majorities’ diversity-affirming beliefs. In Chapter 1, I 
argued that contemporary attitudes about gender/sex minorities are entwined with beliefs about 
the nature of gender/sex categories, or gender/sex diversity beliefs. Further, I showed that 
understanding prejudice toward gender/sex minorities relies on better understanding gender/sex 
diversity beliefs, and it is vitally important to do so in the present sociopolitical context of 
pervasive prejudice and discrimination against gender/sex minorities.  
I conducted a series of empirical studies to explore contemporary variation in beliefs 
about gender/sex diversity and examine their correlates and consequences. In Chapter 2, I 
conducted an online study of people's definitions of common gender/sex terms in order to better 
understand variation in how people conceptualize gender/sex categories. I found that whether 
participants included sociocultural or biological content in their definitions varied across terms, 
such that feminine and masculine were primarily comprised of sociocultural content, female and 
male were primarily biological, and woman and man definitions were comprised of both 
sociocultural and biological content. Further, whether participants were gender/sex and/or sexual 
minorities or majorities affected the content and complexity of their definitions.  
In Chapter 3, I explored a subsample of TERF adherents who participated in the research 
described in Chapter 2 en masse in order to fill it with cissexist perspectives. I named
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this unexpected phenomenon an “avalanche sample,” because it parallels “snowball sampling” 
(also known as respondent-driven sampling, in which researchers ask participants to recruit 
others); but, unlike respondent-driven sampling, an avalanche sample is sudden, unsolicited, and 
disruptive. I analyzed factors that led to the avalanche sample in my research, including group 
emotions like anger and fear, the role of whiteness and its relationship to felt entitlement toward 
the stewardship of science, and status threats for dominant social groups. I concluded that online 
survey researchers studying diversity-related topics in general, and especially those who study 
gender/sex diversity, should be aware of the possibility of sociopolitically motivated disruptive 
actions like avalanche samples.  
Next, in Chapter 4, I developed and validated the Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale 
(GSDB). The GSDB is a robust, unique predictor of feelings toward gender/sex minorities and 
displays strong psychometric properties. Iterative factor analyses across multiple studies 
indicated that the latent structure of gender/sex diversity beliefs is primarily based on affirmation 
or denial of the validity of gender/sex minority identities and experiences. Only primarily so, 
because a smaller subset of gender/sex diversity beliefs factored based on particular sub-topics, 
including whether surgery is necessary to validate a transgender person’s gender/sex.  
In Chapter 5, I developed an intervention utilizing sexual configurations theory (SCT; 
van Anders, 2015) to transform cisgender participants’ gender/sex diversity beliefs and feelings 
toward gender/sex minorities. The SCT intervention effectively increased majorities’ gender/sex 
diversity affirming beliefs and warm feelings toward gender/sex minorities. I also found that 
intergroup contact, operationalized as whether gender/sex majority participants have friends, 
family members, and/or acquaintances who are gender/sex minorities, was a strong predictor of 
both gender/sex diversity beliefs and feelings toward gender/sex minorities. 
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In this final chapter, I discuss the implications of my dissertation for understanding 
contemporary beliefs and attitudes about gender/sex diversity and for future research in this field. 
Contributions to the Field 
My research makes numerous contributions to the study of rapidly shifting societal 
beliefs about the nature of gender/sex. First, the findings of Chapter 2 demonstrate that 
gender/sex diversity beliefs are embedded in variations in how people define and understand 
gender/sex categories. Current policy battles over gender/sex minorities’ access to public space, 
healthcare, and other arenas of public and private life often revolve around different 
interpretations of the scope of gender/sex categories and their social significance (e.g., General 
Assembly of North Carolina, 2016). Prior theory has suggested commonsense framings of 
gender/sex categories as neatly bounded are flawed at a metaphysical level; my research adds to 
this body of work by demonstrating the non-universality of how individuals draw boundaries 
around gender/sex categories (Bettcher, 2007; Butler, 1993; Fausto‐Sterling, 2005). At the same 
time, my research showed significant patterns in how people define gender/sex terms, suggesting 
that different interpretations or uses of language might cue particular ways of understanding 
gender/sex. For example, a researcher using female and male instead of woman and man might 
cue more biological and fewer sociocultural associations in participants in their research. My 
findings raise new questions about the consequences of particular uses of gender/sex language in 
many areas, including scientific communication (e.g., how do people interpret gender/sex 
difference or similarity claims based on which terms are used?) and social perception (e.g., are 
people’s understandings of gender/sex terms related to how they perceive certain gender/sex 
groups?), among others. 
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In Chapter 4, I found further evidence of heterogeneity in people's understandings of 
gender/sex, in this instance via gender/sex diversity beliefs. The development of the GSDB 
yielded insights about the latent structure of contemporary beliefs about the nature of gender/sex. 
Specifically, people's gender/sex diversity beliefs are primarily organized based on whether they 
affirm the existence of gender/sex diversity or deny its existence. Affirming beliefs included a 
range of social constructionist beliefs and certain essentialist beliefs also. These findings add 
clarity to ongoing debates about the relationships of essentialism and social constructionism to 
prejudice. Prior research has argued that essentialism is linked to prejudice toward a range of 
social groups, including women and racial/ethnic minorities, but has seemingly paradoxically 
found that some essentialist beliefs are related to positive feelings toward sexual minorities 
(Grzanka et al., 2016; Haslam et al., 2002; Hegarty & Golden, 2008). Some researchers have 
suggested essentialism is linked to negative feelings toward gender/sex minorities, unlike with 
sexual minorities (Wilton et al., 2018). However, my findings suggest a similar logic structures 
the relationship between beliefs about gender/sex minorities and sexual minorities. Essentialist 
beliefs that locate an essence or underlying reality within gender/sex minority identities (e.g., 
“Transgender identities are natural”) are linked to positive feelings toward gender/sex minorities, 
whereas essentialist beliefs that locate an essence in majority gender/sexes only (e.g., “There 
have only been two genders throughout history”) are related to prejudice. Therefore, the central 
factor in whether a belief about gender/sex links to prejudice against gender/sex minorities is not 
whether it is essentialist or not, but whether it is broadly interpreted to legitimize the existence of 
minority gender/sexes. 
The GSDB may prove to be a valuable tool for researchers of gender/sex diversity, 
transphobia, and beliefs and attitudes about gender/sex at a broad level. Prior research on 
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gender/sex essentialism has typically focused exclusively on differences between (implicitly 
cisgender) women and men who are normatively feminine and masculine, respectively (Haslam 
et al., 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2006; Skewes et al., 2018). And even when prior research has 
addressed gender/sex diversity, it has not systematically examined multiple facets of essentialism 
or included social constructionist beliefs at all (Kanamori et al., 2017; Tee & Hegarty, 2006). 
The GSDB allows survey researchers to study how people think about gender/sex diversity with 
a nuanced, valid, and reliable measure that is inclusive of a broad range of essentialist and social 
constructionist beliefs about the nature of gender/sex. Researchers of prejudice against 
gender/sex minorities in particular are likely to find value in including the GSDB in future 
studies. Gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs uniquely predicted a large amount of variance in 
feelings toward gender/sex minorities, beyond other closely associated and commonly studied 
variables such as conservatism and gender essentialism (i.e., operationalized as beliefs about 
differences between women and men). This finding opens up numerous new lines of inquiry into 
what role gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs have in structuring feelings toward gender/sex 
minorities. That is, does believing gender/sex is a diverse social category lead to positive feelings 
toward gender/sex minorities (or vice versa)?  
The research described in Chapter 5 applied insights from Chapters 2 and 4 about 
heterogeneity in understandings of the nature of gender/sex toward an intervention into prejudice 
against gender/sex minorities. Some prior research has found that manipulations focused on 
intergroup contact and/or cognitive empathy can effectively reduce prejudice against gender/sex 
minorities (Broockman & Kalla, 2016; McDermott et al., 2018; Walch, Sinkkanen, et al., 2012). 
But it remains unclear whether interventions that provide majorities relatively low-quality 
contact with minorities (i.e., watching a video or listening to a panel, as opposed to forming a 
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meaningful, cooperative relationship over time) are capable of shifting the beliefs about 
gender/sex that underlie prejudice and institutional discrimination and fostering gender/sex 
diversity affirming beliefs. My research adds to this literature by introducing a new potential 
solution: guided introspection about one's own majority identity using a minority-centered 
framework. I found that having gender/sex majorities situate their own identities via SCT led to 
positive changes in gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs and warm feelings toward gender/sex 
minorities.  
For people who hold gender/sex diversity denying beliefs, SCT represents a significant 
worldview shift. SCT presents gender/sex as multifaceted, containing both binary and nonbinary 
elements, and provides space for communicating nuance that both gender/sex minorities and 
majorities are capable of using (Abed et al., 2019; Schudson et al., 2017). By soliciting 
gender/sex majorities to situate themselves within gender/sex diversity as delineated by SCT, my 
intervention was able to affect both majorities’ feelings toward minorities and also their broader 
beliefs about the nature of gender/sex. My research thereby demonstrates an understudied 
linkage between majority individuals’ self-concepts, their broader views of social categories, and 
their attitudes about minority groups. Research on prejudice toward other social groups (e.g., 
ableism, heterosexism, etc.) might benefit from examining this relationship between majorities’ 
self-concepts and their beliefs and attitudes. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
This dissertation yielded insights about contemporary variation in beliefs about 
gender/sex with certain constraints on their generalizability that future research should address. 
One of the most significant constraints on the generalizability of all the present results is how 
beliefs about gender/sex are deeply shaped by culture and time. Of course, the study of all social 
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phenomena is shaped by culture and time. But it is often especially salient in research on 
gender/sex diversity because gender/sex is heavily essentialized and commonly imagined as a 
transhistorical universal (Gelman, 2003; Haslam et al., 2000). Research on gender/sex diversity 
and gender/sex minority identities themselves are therefore sometimes critiqued as excessively 
culture-bound and uniquely a product of Western societies in the 21st century (Clark et al., 
2019). Because gender/sex diversity beliefs challenge this transhistorical narrative and have only 
entered gender/sex majorities’ consciousness recently, this research might be subject to similar 
critiques. And certainly, the results of my studies are specific to the contexts in which they were 
collected (i.e., the U.S. in the 21st century, with majority white and college-educated samples). 
But gender/sex diversity itself is not a recent or Western-only phenomenon (Dutta & Roy, 2014; 
Towle & Morgan, 2002). And further, research on majority gender/sexes that excludes 
considerations of gender/sex diversity is also culturally and historically specific in its erasure. 
Therefore, to recognize the cultural and historical specificity of research on beliefs about 
gender/sex is not to cede its value, but to properly contextualize it. My research opens up new 
lines of inquiry related to how gender/sex diversity beliefs might be similar or different across 
cultural contexts and at different points in the future as people's beliefs about gender/sex and 
broader social conditions continue to change. 
One limitation of my dissertation consistent across all studies is my reliance on online 
convenience samples. Although there is a considerable amount of data to suggest that 
participants from MTurk (Chapters 3 and 4) perform similarly to general population samples in a 
range of research contexts, cautious interpretation is still important (Clifford et al., 2015; Peer et 
al., 2014). In Chapter 2, a convenience sample was useful because my goal was to explore 
heterogeneity in definitions of gender/sex terms across social locations and recruiting online 
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allowed for targeted recruitment of gender/sex and sexual minorities. But, my use of a 
convenience sample also means that my research will need to be replicated with population-level 
studies with diverse groups of English-speakers in order to make certain frequency claims, such 
as how common it is for people to conceptualize identity as a component of woman/man vs. 
masculine/feminine vs. female/male, for instance. Further, as detailed in Chapter 3, the presence 
of the FB sample (consisting of anti-transgender online groups) demonstrated how data 
collection in online contexts brings unique challenges and can introduce polarized perspectives.  
While the GSDB developed in Chapter 4 is useful for research with gender/sex 
majorities, one current limitation is that it might not be sufficiently nuanced for in-depth 
exploration of how gender/sex minorities think about gender/sex diversity. Although I developed 
the GSDB with significant input from gender/sex minority academic and community experts, I 
empirically tested it with an almost entirely majority sample. Future research could analyze 
measurement invariance of the GSDB across gender/sex minorities and majorities (i.e., whether 
patterns in how minorities and majorities respond to the GSDB are similar or different), although 
it is highly probable that the GSDB represents the latent structure of contemporary beliefs about 
gender/sex diversity among majorities only. Not only might minority and majority participants 
respond differently to the same items, but exploratory factor analysis can produce entirely 
different latent structures across participant social locations (Chadwick et al., 2017). Therefore, it 
would be prudent to test the full preliminary item list – or even an expanded and/or qualitatively 
different item list – with a gender/sex minority sample to create a version of the GSDB that 
better represents beliefs about gender/sex diversity that circulate within gender/sex minority 
communities.  
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The SCT intervention in Chapter 5 showed considerable promise for future prejudice 
reduction efforts, and I plan to conduct further research to determine for whom it is most 
effective and under what conditions. First, it is important to attempt to replicate my finding of the 
SCT intervention’s effectiveness relative to the control conditions, particularly because the 
significance of the effect depended on the outcome measure (i.e., gender/sex diversity affirming 
beliefs or warmth toward gender/sex minorities) and the specific control (i.e., Video Only or 
Neutral). It is also necessary to address the role of intergroup contact in follow-up studies. The 
present study suggested that SCT might be more effective as an intervention for gender/sex 
majorities who have a family member, friend, and/or acquaintance who is a gender/sex minority. 
By what mechanism might intergroup contact affect how people interpret SCT or engage with 
the intervention? Is it possible to design the intervention in a way that is especially effective for 
people without intergroup contact, who had much more negative attitudes about gender/sex 
minorities? And finally, it is important for future research to determine whether alterations to the 
SCT intervention might help it reduce prejudice durably over time. I did not find any effect of 
the intervention at follow-up four weeks later, which suggests that its benefits waned over time. 
Ultimately, my research seeks to determine how to positively change gender/sex majorities’ 
gender/sex diversity beliefs and feelings toward gender/sex minorities in ways that last far 
beyond a single laboratory session. Future research will incorporate social psychological insights 
about persuasive messages, such as presenting gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs as 
descriptively normative (Cialdini et al., 1990). 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation explored contemporary heterogeneity in gender/sex diversity beliefs, 
their links to prejudice against gender/sex minorities, and the efficacy of a prejudice reduction 
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intervention for gender/sex majorities focused on self-knowledge. I found evidence of 
considerable variation in how people think about and define gender/sex categories, and patterns 
that suggest people understand gender/sex terms to carry different implications for the 
sociocultural and biological nature of gender/sex categories. My research also demonstrated that 
gender/sex diversity beliefs are primarily structured based on whether they affirm or deny the 
existence of gender/sex diversity, and gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs have considerable 
value for predicting attitudes about gender/sex minorities. Finally, I found that soliciting 
gender/sex majorities to deeply consider their own gender/sex identities using SCT, a framework 
that centers gender/sex minority experiences and identities, improved their attitudes about 
gender/sex minorities and their gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs.  
 Prejudice and discrimination against gender/sex minorities remains a pervasive problem 
among gender/sex majorities. The task of transforming how gender/sex majorities think about 
gender/sex categories is an urgent one that requires psychologists’ attention. The cost of 
gender/sex diversity denial is evident in discriminatory laws, dehumanizing rhetoric, and even 
human lives. This dissertation provides conceptual and methodological tools for researchers 
invested in challenging gender/sex majorities’ prejudice against minorities, including a new 
construct – gender/sex diversity beliefs – that is a core determinant of prejudice toward or 
affirmation of gender/sex minority identities. Gender/sex is a complex social category that 
extends far beyond rigid, essentialist definitions of female and male, and promoting expansive 
understandings of gender/sex is crucial for building a future that is safe for gender/sex 
minorities. 
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Table 2.1. Composition of each group by gender/sex and sexual orientation. 
 Gender/sex Sexual orientation  
 Women Men Another gender/sex Sexual minority Sexual majority Total† 
GSMin 39 17 26 71 9 82 
CisMin 32 8 0 40 0 40 
CisMaj 45 16 1* 0 62 62 
FB 96 6 16 72 38 120 
† Row totals do not always equal group total due to nonresponse. 
* Participant wrote “female” and “I don’t like being called a woman.” 
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Table 2.2 Frequency of definitions that received each biological or sociocultural content code for each gender/sex category. 
 Woman (n = 304) 
Man 
(n = 302) 
Feminine 
(n = 302) 
Masculine 
(n = 305) 
Female 
(n = 304) 
Male 
(n = 305) 
Sociocultural       
Sociocultural origin 15 15 105 104 7 4 
Identity 70 69 3 3 48 49 
Roles/expectations 13 13 60 59 4 3 
Social power 9 6 24 23 4 4 
Behaviors 17 13 90 94 7 6 
Softness/hardness 2 3 50 25 3 2 
Physical presentation 14 14 95 84 6 3 
Preferences 3 1 11 15 1 0 
Expressive/communal traits 7 3 76 1 5 0 
Instrumental/agentic traits 8 12 4 82 1 5 
Traits (general) 19 23 118 117 9 7 
       
Biological       
Biological origin 29 29 1 2 82 82 
Genitals 34 37 2 5 77 89 
Gonads 7 12 0 1 18 31 
Hormones 6 5 3 4 17 20 
Chromosomes 17 20 4 2 94 89 
Gametes 6 7 1 1 65 71 
Reproduction 16 7 6 1 56 38 
Uterus 11 0 0 0 26 0 
Other sex characteristics 15 14 15 24 39 32 
Body (general) 21 19 16 17 51 52 
 
Both       
Origin is both sociocultural 
and biological 7 5 8 7 4 4 
       
 
   109 
Table 2.3. Frequency of definitions that received each descriptive code for each gender/sex category. 
Descriptive codes Woman (n = 304) 
Man 
(n = 302) 
Feminine 
(n = 302) 
Masculine 
(n = 305) 
Female 
(n = 304) 
Male 
(n = 305) 
Definition uses qualifying language 
 
35 33 78 74 43 46 
Category is defined by stereotypes 
 
5 4 39 43 1 1 
Category is meaningless or unhelpful 
 
1 2 7 11 2 1 
Definition contradicts norms 
 
10 7 13 11 8 7 
Mentions cisgender/ transgender 
 
33 31 7 6 25 25 
Mentions gender 24 19 22 21 17 15 
Mentions sex 15 17 16 16 90 88 
Mentions both gender and sex 
 
7 7 4 3 3 5 
Mentions woman - 5 75 3 47 3 
Mentions man 2 - 1 81 2 34 
Mentions feminine 18 0 - 2 7 1 
Mentions masculine 0 18 2 - 0 10 
Mentions female 193 2 108 0 - 16 
Mentions male 2 191 2 111 14 - 
Mentions other two categories within a 
set1 13 13 17 12 3 3 
Mentions categories across sets 5 4 20 20 4 6 
1”Set” refers to woman/feminine/female or man/masculine/male. 
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Table 2.4. Examples for levels of the definition complexity code. 
Complexity 
Code 
Description Example 
1 Low 
differentiation 
Woman: “Someone who identifies as female” 
 
Masculine: “Characteristics of a man” 
 
2 Moderate 
differentiation 
Man: “A person who is born with male sexual organs and/or who identifies as a man” 
 
Male: “Someone with male genitalia. This describes the physical sex of a person more than 
their gender identity.” 
 
3 High 
differentiation; no 
integration 
Female: “A person who had their sex marked as such on their birth certificate and at least at 
the time of their birth appeared to have or was surgically altered to have a particular kind of 
external genitalia.” 
 
Woman: “Usually a person born female & raised as a girl, with all the cultural/societal 
conditioning about femininity, gender roles/expectations/limits, etc.” 
 
4 High 
differentiation; 
some integration 
Feminine: “Femininity is complicated. There are expected roles of wanting children, cooking, 
taking care of the household, cleaning. I believe in equality among the sexes. I myself see 
myself as feminine. I wear dresses, skirts, paint my nails, wear makeup, wear clothing to 
show off my features. Those are considered feminine in this society. If men had always done 
the same, it would be considered more normal among the sexes and not feminine.” 
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Table 2.5. Logistic regression models predicting odds of including biological content in definitions for CisMin, CisMaj, and FB as 
compared to GSMin. 
 Woman Man Feminine Masculine Female Male 
Predictor  
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
CisMin† 0.07 
(0.50) 
1.07 
(0.40, 2.84) 
0.09 
(0.50) 
1.09 
(0.41, 2.91) 
-0.63 
(0.69) 
0.53 
(0.14, 2.07) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
1.22 
(0.44, 3.40) 
-0.17 
(0.40) 
0.84 
(0.39, 1.84) 
-0.29 
(0.41) 
0.75 
(0.34, 1.66) 
CisMaj† 1.19* 
(0.40) 
3.29* 
(1.51, 7.17) 
0.81 
(0.41) 
2.24 
(1.01, 4.98) 
-0.17 
(0.53) 
0.84 
(0.30, 2.37) 
0.43 
(0.44) 
1.54 
(0.65, 3.68) 
0.40 
(0.36) 
1.49 
(0.73, 3.01) 
0.42 
(0.37) 
1.53 
(0.74, 3.16) 
FB 0.45 
(0.40) 
1.58 
(0.73, 3.41) 
0.51 
(0.39) 
1.66 
(0.77, 3.58) 
0.29 
(0.48) 
0.55 
(0.52, 3.42) 
-0.05 
(0.47) 
0.95 
(0.38, 2.40) 
2.23* 
(0.47) 
9.33* 
(3.73, 23.33) 
2.25* 
(0.49) 
9.47* 
(3.63, 24.66) 
FB excluded 
 
 
χ2 
(df = 2) 
11.06* 4.53 0.90 0.94 2.13 2.90 
p 
 
0.004 0.10 0.64 0.62 0.35 0.23 
FB included 
χ2 
(df = 3) 
11.11* 4.46 2.00 1.72 36.50* 34.04* 
p 
 
0.01 0.22 0.57 0.63 < 0.001 < 0.001 
* = significantly different from GSMin (at adjusted α as determined by Benjamini-Hochberg procedure) 
† = reported values are from models in which FB is excluded 
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Table 2.6. Logistic regression models predicting odds of including sociocultural content in definitions for CisMin, CisMaj, and FB 
as compared to GSMin. 
 Woman Man Feminine Masculine Female Male 
Predictor  
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
 
B (SE) 
OR 
(95% CI) 
CisMin† -0.78 
(0.42) 
0.46 
(0.20, 1.04) 
-0.74 
(0.41) 
0.48 
(0.21, 1.08) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
1.02 
(0.27, 3.88) 
-0.44 
(0.56) 
0.65 
(0.22, 1.93) 
-0.17 
(0.41) 
0.84 
(0.38, 1.88) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
1.05 
(0.46, 2.41) 
CisMaj† -1.63* 
(0.38) 
0.20* 
(0.09, 0.42) 
-1.37* 
(0.37) 
0.25* 
(0.12, 0.53) 
-0.08 
(0.60) 
0.92 
(0.28, 2.98) 
-0.65 
(0.49) 
0.52 
(0.20, 1.37) 
-0.71 
(0.38) 
0.49 
(0.23, 1.03) 
-0.79 
(0.41) 
0.45 
(0.21, 1.00) 
FB -2.52* 
(0.40) 
0.08* 
(0.04, 0.18) 
-2.78* 
(0.41) 
0.06* 
(0.03, 0.14) 
0.21 
(0.58) 
1.24 
(0.39, 3.89) 
0.62 
(0.55) 
1.85 
(0.63, 5.46) 
-2.34* 
(0.48) 
0.10* 
(0.04, 0.25) 
-1.82* 
(0.47) 
0.16* 
(0.06, 0.41) 
FB excluded 
χ2 
(df = 2) 
19.36* 14.17* 0.03 1.80 3.77 4.86 
p 
 
< 0.001 0.001 0.98 0.41 0.15 0.09 
FB included 
χ2 
(df = 3) 
51.84* 57.82* 0.55 7.76 32.67* 34.04* 
p 
 
< 0.001 < 0.001 0.91 0.05 < .001 < .001 
* = significantly different from GSMin (at adjusted α as determined by Benjamini-Hochberg procedure) 
† = reported values are from models in which FB is excluded 
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Table 3.1. Participant demographics.  
Demographic  Study 1 N (%)  Study 2 N (%) 
Education 
 
   
 Some high school 4 (1.3) 1 (0.3) 
 High school graduate 58 (19.1) 43 (14.4) 
 Some college 60 (19.8) 65 (21.7) 
 Training other than college 7 (2.3) 8 (2.7) 
 Graduate from two-year college 27 (8.9) 38 (12.7) 
 Graduate from four-year college 118 (38.9) 105 (35.1) 
 Some graduate or professional school 6 (2.0) 7 (2.3) 
 Received graduate or professional degree 23 (7.6) 32 (10.7) 
 
Gender/Sex 
   
 Woman 109 (36.0) 138 (46.2) 
 Man 190 (62.7) 160 (53.5) 
 Gender/Sex Diverse 3 (1.0) 1 (0.3) 
 
Race/Ethnicity  
 
 
  Asian / Asian American  10 (3.3)  19 (6.4) 
  Black / African American  25 (8.3)  23 (7.7) 
  Indigenous / Native American  4 (1.3)  2 (0.7) 
  Latinx / Hispanic  11 (3.6)  19 (6.4) 
  Multiracial  9 (3.0)  5 (1.7) 
  White 233 (76.9)  229 (76.6) 
  Nonresponse  11 (3.6)  2 (0.7) 
 
Sexual Orientation/Identity 
   
  Asexual / Demisexual  1 (0.3)  4 (1.3) 
  Bisexual / Pansexual 23 (7.6)  19 (6.4) 
 Gay / Lesbian 9 (3.0) 11 (3.7) 
 Heterosexual 263 (86.8) 259 (86.6) 
 Mostly Heterosexual 1 (0.3) 2 (0.7) 
 Queer 1 (0.3) 0 (0) 
 Nonresponse 5 (1.7) 4 (1.3) 
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Table 3.2. Rotated factor loadings and item-level descriptive statistics for 27 initially retained items of GSDB. 
  
Item Affirmation Gender Normativity Uniformity Surgery Upbringing 
Biology & 
Gender 
M (SD) Skewness / 
Kurtosis 
There are many different 
gender identities people can 
have. 
.816 -.184 -.085 -.070 .058 -.027 4.02 (2.07) 
-.15 /  
-1.32 
Non-binary gender identities 
are valid. .813 -.274 -.153 -.061 .045 .072 
4.07 
(2.10) 
-.16 / 
 -1.31 
A person’s gender can change 
over time. .800 -.094 -.105 .027 .187 -.053 
3.43 
(1.96) 
.21 /  
-1.23 
Being a woman or man has 
nothing to do with what 
genitals you have. 
.799 -.180 -.242 -.139 -.022 -.050 3.46 (2.00) 
.21 /  
-1.26 
Transgender identities are 
natural. .769 -.218 -.210 .005 -.007 .042 
3.97 
(2.04) 
-.07 /  
-1.25 
Biological sex is not just 
female or male; there are 
many possibilities. 
.754 -.108 -.089 .001 -.031 .067 3.46 (1.99) 
.21 /  
-1.22 
It is possible to have more 
than one gender identity at 
the same time. 
.748 -.047 -.203 -.056 .150 -.003 3.52 (1.96) 
.16 /  
-1.12 
It would be best if society 
stopped labeling people based 
on whether they are female or 
male. 
.733 -.102 -.096 -.011 .105 -.074 3.72 (1.98) 
.08 / 
-1.21 
Non-binary gender identities 
have always existed. .710 -.193 -.068 -.103 .031 .047 
4.14 
(2.02) 
-.24 /  
-1.35 
The only thing that 
determines whether someone 
truly is a woman or a man is 
.679 -.090 -.064 -.015 .002 .088 3.77 (2.10) 
.08 /  
-.64 
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whether they identify as a 
woman or a man. 
People who express their 
gender in ways that go 
against society’s norms are 
just being their true selves. 
.672 -.310 -.135 .022 .074 .085 4.61 (1.84) 
-.60 /  
-.64 
Gender is about how you 
express yourself (e.g., how 
you dress or act). 
.640 .035 .018 -.036 .209 .100 3.52 (1.85) 
.13 /  
-1.10 
Transgender people were 
born the way they are. .622 -.212 -.045 .047 -.047 .222 
4.34 
(1.88) 
-.45 /  
-.86 
Not all cultures have the same 
gender identities. .569 -.145 -.100 -.071 .031 -.097 
4.43 
(1.89) 
-.37 /  
-.86 
*A masculine woman is not 
truly a woman. -.114 .744 .085 .137 .035 .093 
2.15 
(1.35) 
1.59 /  
2.46 
Men who behave in feminine 
ways are looking for 
attention. 
-.379 .720 .180 .016 .072 -.028 2.78 (1.65) 
.71 /  
-.46 
A real man needs to be 
masculine. -.358 .711  .103 .034 -.012 .132 
2.96 
(1.79) 
.74 /  
-.48 
**Transgender men can only 
truly be men if they look and 
behave in masculine ways. 
-.102 .550 .165 .361 .012 .129 2.71 (1.47) 
.55 /  
-.53 
People of the same gender 
tend to be similar to each 
other. 
-.344 .184 .663 .036 .018 .177 3.74 (1.62) 
-.05 /  
-.95 
People of the same biological 
sex are mostly similar to each 
other. 
-.309 .261 .619 .038 .035 .063 3.72 (1.68) 
-.03 /  
-1.04 
Feminine people are similar 
to other feminine people, and 
masculine people are similar 
to other masculine people. 
-.260 .288 .579 .152 .017 .080 4.00 (1.55) 
-.33 / 
-.71 
   116 
 
 
 
 
A person with a vagina can 
only ever be a man if they 
have surgery to have a penis 
instead. 
-.222 .325 .121 .721 .086 .039 3.18 (1.77) 
.43 /  
-.76 
A person with a penis can 
only ever be a woman if they 
have surgery to have a vagina 
instead. 
-.286 .305 .107 .688 .066 .081 3.17 (1.77) 
.44 /  
-.75 
Gender identity is affected by 
how a person is raised. .164 .150 -.010 .039 .716 -.055 
3.71 
(1.67) 
-.13 /  
-1.00 
A person’s experiences 
growing up determine 
whether they will be feminine 
or masculine. 
.025 .052 .099 .094 .685 .179 3.46 (1.57) 
-.15 /  
-.99 
†Feminine men are feminine 
because of their biology. .080 .118 .094 .025 .035 .658 
3.85 
(1.62) 
-.12 /  
-.61 
†Masculine women are 
masculine because of their 
biology. 
-.028 .123 .154 .044 .097 .639 3.83 (1.64) 
-.15 /  
-.71 
 
Factor internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s α) 
 
.95 .83 .80 .85 .66 .67 
  
* Removed due to unacceptable skewness and kurtosis 
** Removed due to low factor loading in Study 2 
† Removed due to factor’s low test-retest reliability in Study 3 
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Table 3.3. Study 1 correlations between GSDB factors, Genderism and Transphobia Scale-Revised (GTS-R), and Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS). 
 Affirmation Gender Normativity Uniformity Surgery Upbringing 
Biology 
& Gender GTS-R MCSDS 
Affirmation - -.49** -.50** -.36** .13* .025 -.69** -.04 
Gender 
Normativity  - .50** .51** .11* .21** .80** .12* 
Uniformity   - .38** .07 .22** .52** .12* 
Surgery    - .14* .17** .45** .08 
Upbringing     - .12* .06 -.05 
Biology & 
Gender 
     - .10 -.05 
GTS-R       - .06 
MCSDS        - 
** Correlation is significant at p < .01 
* Correlation is significant at p < .05 
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Table 3.4. Model summaries for confirmatory factor analysis of the GSDB. 
 χ2 df p χ2/df CFI TLI SRMR 
RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
GSDB-Full 514.36 219 <.001 2.35 .94 .93 .05 
.067 
(.060, .075) 
GSDB-Affirm 229.40 77 <.001 2.98 .96 .96 .03 
.075 
(.063, .089) 
GSDB-2 906.35 187 <.001 4.85 .85 .83 .11 
.113 
(.106, .121) 
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Table 3.5. Study 2 correlations between GSDB factors and gender/sex feeling thermometers. 
 Trans Women 
Trans 
Men 
Non-
Binary  
Cis 
Women Cis Men 
Fem 
Men 
Masc 
Men 
Fem 
Women 
Masc 
Women 
Women - 
general 
Men - 
general 
AF .63** .65** .65** .16** .13* .46** -.09 -.08 .43** .00 -.08 
GN -.53** -.53** -.48** .01 -.01 -.50** .23** .16** -.45** .02 .15* 
UN -.28** -.27** -.21** .04 .03 -.23** .19** .15** -.22** .10 .19** 
SU -.17** -.15** -.21** -.08 .00 -.17** .05 -.02 -.13* -.01 .02 
UP .01 .03 .03 -.09 -.11 .00 -.03 -.12* .03 -.11 -.06 
M 59.68 59.64 56.39 76.62 72.57 64.49 75.06 81.62 65.29 80.59 75.06 
SD 30.54 30.88 31.77 23.81 24.27 26.47 21.84 19.11 26.07 18.96 20.42 
AF = Affirmation; GN = Gender Normativity; UN = Uniformity; SU = Surgery; UP = Upbringing; Fem = Feminine; Masc = Masculine 
** Correlation is significant at p < .01 
* Correlation is significant at p < .05 
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Table 3.6.  Study 2 correlations between GSDB factors, SDO, RWA, NFC, GES, and Conservatism. 
 AF GN UN SU UP SDO RWA NFC GES Cons. 
AF - -.53** -.25** -.26** .13* -.52** -.61** -.06 -.65** -.63** 
GN  - .46** .25** .08 .45** .60** .14* .65** .47** 
UN   - .15** .15* .25** .39** .11 .54** .29** 
SU    - .15* .21** .19** .06 .25** .19** 
UP     - -.01 -.02 .09 .02 .01 
SDO      - .60** -.06 .49** .59** 
RWA       - .22** .58** .69** 
NFC        - .16** .15** 
GES         - .52** 
Cons.          - 
AF = Affirmation; GN = Gender Normativity; UN = Uniformity; SU = Surgery; UP = Upbringing; SDO = social dominance orientation; RWA = 
right-wing authoritarianism; NFC = need for closure; GES = Gender Essentialism Scale; Cons. = conservatism 
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* = significant at p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. Hierarchal regression for variables predicting feelings toward gender/sex minorities. 
Predictor β SE t p R R2adj ΔR2adj 
Step 1     .63 .39 .39 
   Conservatism -.12 .40 -1.77 .08    
   Gender Essentialism -.30 .06 -5.21 <.001*    
   Need for Closure -.12 .10 -1.49 .14    
   Right-Wing Auth. -.06 .11 -.76 .45    
   Social Dominance -.26 .09 -4.19 <.001*    
Step 2     .72 .52 .13 
   Conservatism .03 .38 .54 .59    
   Gender Essentialism -.03 .07 -.43 .67    
   Need for Closure -.11 .09 -2.51 .01*    
   Right-Wing Auth. .08 .11 1.19 .24    
   Social Dominance -.23 .08 -4.04 <.001*    
   Affirmation .50 .09 7.63 <.001*    
   Gender Normativity -.20 .58 -3.37 .001*    
   Uniformity <.01 .37 .02 .99    
   Surgery .04 .39 1.01 .32    
   Upbringing -.02 .46 -.45 .65    
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Table 4.1. Participant demographics.  
Demographic   N (%)  
Education 
 
  
 Some high school or less 8 (1.3) 
 High school graduate 77 (12.8) 
 Some college 139 (23.2) 
 Training other than college 28 (4.7) 
 Graduate from two-year college 94 (15.7) 
 Graduate from four-year college 177 (29.5) 
 Some graduate or professional school 14 (2.3) 
 Received graduate or professional degree 47 (7.8) 
 Nonresponse 16 (2.7) 
 
Gender/Sex 
  
 Woman 268 (49.5) 
 Man 297 (44.7) 
 Gender/Sex Minority 18 (3.0) 
 Cisgender* 14 (2.3) 
 Nonresponse 3 (0.5) 
 
Race/Ethnicity  
 
  Asian / Asian American  30 (5.0)  
  Black / African American  48 (8.0)  
  Indigenous / Native American  4 (0.7)  
  Latinx / Hispanic  25 (4.1)  
  Multiracial  20 (3.3)  
  White 469 (78.2)  
  Nonresponse  4 (0.7)  
 
Sexual Orientation/Identity 
  
  Asexual  6 (1.0)  
  Bisexual / Pansexual 44 (7.3)  
 Gay / Lesbian 25 (4.2) 
 Heterosexual 515 (85.8) 
 Queer 2 (0.3) 
 Nonresponse 8 (1.3) 
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Figure 2.1. Mean definition complexity ratings for GSMin, CisMin, CisMaj, and FB for each gender/sex category. Different letter 
superscripts indicate significant differences between groups in post-hoc comparisons following Kruskal-Wallis tests (Benjamini-
Hochberg adjusted p < 0.05). Complexity ratings differed across groups for all gender/sex categories – although for feminine, only 
when excluding the FB group (therefore, no letter superscript is included for FB in this analysis). 
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Figure 3.1. Five-factor model of the final, 23-item GSDB. See Appendix B for final item list. 
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Figure 4.1. Effect of SCT intervention on feelings toward gender/sex minorities at baseline. * = p < .05; all other pairwise 
comparisons are non-significant. 
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Figure 4.2. Effect of SCT intervention on gender/sex diversity affirming beliefs at baseline. * = p < .05; all other pairwise 
comparisons are non-significant.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Diagrams Video Only Neutral
G
en
de
r/s
ex
 d
iv
er
sit
y 
af
fir
m
in
g 
be
lie
fs
Condition
* 
   127 
Appendix A: Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale, Preliminary Item List 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements about gender and sex. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
1. Biological sex can never truly be changed. 
2. A person’s gender can change over time. 
3. A person’s genes determine their gender. 
4. Gender identity is affected by how a person is raised. 
5. A person’s experiences growing up determine whether they will be feminine or 
masculine. 
6. A person’s gender identity depends on their experiences growing up. 
7. No one can change their gender identity. 
8. No one can control whether their gender identity changes over time. 
9. A person can change their gender identity if they want to. 
10. It is not possible for someone to choose whether they are transgender or cisgender (i.e., 
non-transgender). 
11. How feminine or masculine a person feels is outside their control. 
12. If someone is raised as a boy, their behavior will always be somewhat masculine even if 
they identify as a different gender as an adult 
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13.  If someone is raised as a girl, their behavior will always be somewhat feminine even if  
they identify as a different gender as an adult. 
14. A person with a penis can only ever be a woman if they have surgery to have a vagina 
instead. 
15. A person with a vagina can only ever be a man if they have surgery to have a penis 
instead. 
16. If someone self-identifies as a woman, it doesn’t matter whether she has a vagina – she is 
still a woman. 
17. If someone self-identifies as a man, it doesn’t matter whether he has a penis – he is still a 
man. 
18. Non-binary gender identities (i.e., identities other than “woman” and “man”) are valid.  
19. People who have a non-binary gender identity (i.e., identity other than “woman” or 
“man”) only identify that way to get attention. 
20. A person’s gender identity is an expression of their true self. 
21. Men who behave in feminine ways are looking for attention. 
22.  Women who behave in masculine ways are looking for attention.  
23. People who express their gender in ways that go against society’s norms are just being 
their true selves. 
24. People who have non-binary gender identities (i.e., identities other than “woman” or 
“man”) are just part of a fad that will go away eventually. 
25. Transgender women can only truly be women if they look and behave in feminine ways. 
26. Transgender men can only truly be men if they look and behave in masculine ways. 
27.  Being feminine is a defining part of being a woman. 
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28.  A real man needs to be masculine. 
29.  Gender is about how you express yourself (e.g., how you dress or act). 
30. There is more to being a man than having a penis. 
31. There is more to being a woman than having a vagina. 
32. The main thing that determines if someone is a woman or a man is whether they have a 
vagina or a penis. 
33. Whether someone is a woman or a man depends on whether they have ovaries or 
testicles. 
34. Hormones determine whether someone is a woman or a man. 
35.  A person’s gender depends on whether their body produces eggs or sperm. 
36. Whether someone is a woman or a man depends on their physical features like breasts, 
hips, facial hair, or muscularity. 
37. Having the ability to bear children at some point in your life is necessary for being a 
woman. 
38. Being a man means having the ability to make a woman pregnant. 
39. Being a woman or a man has nothing to do with what genitals you have. 
40. The only thing that determines whether someone truly is a woman or a man is whether 
they identify as a woman or a man. 
41.  A masculine woman is not truly a woman. 
42.  A feminine man is not truly a man.  
43. Non-binary gender identities (i.e., identities other than woman or man, such as 
genderqueer or agender) are unnatural. 
44. Transgender identities are natural. 
   130 
45.  Cisgender (i.e., non-transgender) identities are natural. 
46. When a baby is born with genitals that are not clearly a vagina or a penis, it is because of 
a mistake of nature. 
47. Gender identity is set at birth. 
48. Transgender people were born the way they are. 
49. If someone has a non-binary gender identity (i.e., identity other than “woman” or “man”), 
it is because of their biology. 
50. Feminine men are feminine because of their biology. 
51. Masculine women are masculine because of their biology. 
52. Many different factors affect whether someone is feminine or masculine; there is no 
single cause. 
53. People choose their gender identity. 
54. People of the same gender tend to be similar to each other.  
55. People of different genders are different from one another in many ways. 
56. People who have the same biological sex are mostly similar to each other. 
57. Feminine people are similar to other feminine people, and masculine people are similar to 
other masculine people. 
58. There are many different ways to be feminine or masculine. 
59. A person’s gender is a reflection of who they are deep down.  
60. Gender identity is a deeply important part of who people are. 
61. Knowing someone’s gender tells you a lot about them. 
62. Knowing whether someone is biologically female or male does not tell you much about 
who they are. 
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63. Knowing whether someone is transgender or not tells you a lot about who they are as a 
person. 
64. You can understand a lot about someone based on whether their behavior is feminine or 
masculine. 
65. “Feminine” and “masculine” are not useful ways to describe people. 
66. As a society, we should stop labeling people based on their gender. 
67. It would be best if society stopped labeling people based on whether they are female or 
male. 
68. It is important to divide certain spaces (e.g., bathrooms) based on gender. 
69. For society to run smoothly, people need to be labeled on the basis of their gender. 
70.  There are many different gender identities people can have.  
71.  There are many possible gender identities beyond just woman or man. 
72.  Biological sex is not just female or male; there are many possibilities. 
73. There are only two genders. 
74. Every person is either female or male. 
75. People are either women or men. 
76. There aren’t many people who totally fit the labels “woman” or “man”. 
77. Almost nobody is completely feminine or masculine; most people are a mix of both. 
78. It is possible to have more than one gender identity at the same time. 
79. Some people do not have a gender identity at all. 
80. Transgender people have always existed in some form, regardless of what they were 
called. 
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81. Non-binary gender identities (i.e., gender identities other than “woman” and “man”) have 
always existed. 
82. There have only been two genders throughout history. 
83. Not all cultures have the same gender identities. 
84. There have always been people who defied society’s expectations for their gender. 
85. More and more people are identifying as transgender or non-binary (i.e., gender identity 
other than “woman” or “man”) because of greater societal tolerance. 
86. The fact that more and more people are identifying as transgender or non-binary (i.e., 
gender identity other than “woman” or “man”) is a trend that will pass eventually. 
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Appendix B: Gender/Sex Diversity Beliefs Scale 
Instructions: Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about gender and 
sex.  
Also, please note these definitions for terms some people might be unfamiliar with: 
Transgender - a person whose gender identity is different from the gender they were assigned at 
birth. Example: "Michael is a transgender man. He was labeled a girl at birth and currently 
identifies as a man." 
Cisgender - a person whose gender identity is the same as the gender they were assigned at birth. 
Example: "Alyssa is a cisgender woman. She was labeled a girl at birth and currently identifies 
as a woman." 
Non-binary - a person whose gender identity exists beyond woman or man or involves both. 
Non-binary identities include genderqueer, agender, etc. Example: "Taylor is non-binary. Taylor 
was labeled a boy at birth but is now agender, and does not identify with man or woman, or any 
gender." 
1. A person’s gender can change over time. (AF1) 
2. Non-binary gender identities are valid. (AF2) 
3. Non-binary gender identities have always existed. (AF3) 
4. People who express their gender in ways that go against society’s norms are just being 
their true selves. (AF4) 
5. Gender is about how you express yourself (e.g., how you dress or act). (AF5) 
6. Being a woman or a man has nothing to do with what genitals you have. (AF6) 
7. The only thing that determines whether someone truly is a woman or a man is whether 
they identify as a woman or a man. (AF7) 
8. Transgender identities are natural. (AF8) 
9. Transgender people were born the way they are. (AF9)
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10. It would be best if society stopped labeling people based on whether they are female or 
male. (AF10) 
11. There are many different gender identities people can have. (AF11) 
12.  Biological sex is not just female or male; there are many possibilities. (AF12) 
13. It is possible to have more than one gender identity at the same time. (AF13) 
14. Not all cultures have the same gender identities. (AF14) 
15. Men who behave in feminine ways are looking for attention. (GN1) 
16.  A real man needs to be masculine. (GN2) 
17. People of the same gender tend to be similar to each other. (UN1) 
18. People who have the same biological sex are mostly similar to each other. (UN2) 
19. Feminine people are similar to other feminine people, and masculine people are similar to 
other masculine people. (UN3) 
20. A person with a penis can only ever be a woman if they have surgery to have a vagina 
instead. (SU1) 
21. A person with a vagina can only ever be a man if they have surgery to have a penis 
instead. (SU2) 
22. Gender identity is affected by how a person is raised. (UP1) 
23. A person’s experiences growing up determine whether they will be feminine or 
masculine. (UP2) 
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Appendix C: Sexual Configurations Theory – Gender/Sex Diagram 
 
 
 
Figure C-1. A gender/sex SCT diagram. 
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